Decentralised electricity systems require effective price and quantity risk management mechanisms but the nature of such systems poses particular problems for satisfying those requirements. Among these problems are investment hold-up risks rooted in the competition facing both electricity retailers and large industrial firms. Additional problems include those of load profile information and bargaining mismatches between generators and customers. Significantly hold-up risks exist not only between retailers and generators but also affect (e.g. fuel) suppliers upstream of generators. Contracts are one means of addressing such problems and represent a particular improvement on spot market trading alone. However we argue that market contracting ...
This paper analyzes the interactions between competitive (wholesale) spot, retail, and forward marke...
We examine the effects of reorganizing electricity markets on capacity investments, retail prices an...
In theory, competitive electricity markets can provide incentives for efficient investment in genera...
Decentralised electricity systems require effective price and quantity risk management mechanisms, b...
Decentralised electricity systems require effective price and quantity risk management mechanisms, b...
National audienceNone of the far-reaching experiments in electricity industry liberalisation was abl...
Vertical separation of generation from electricity retailing has often been required as a condition ...
We study the role of vertical structure in determining generating capacities and retail prices in th...
This book fills a gap in the existing literature by dealing with several issues linked to long-term ...
This paper characterises the impact of vertical integration on price equilibria and incentives to st...
Long-term contracts for electricity can counter market power and reduce prices in short-term markets...
This paper studies how competition and vertical structure jointly determine generating capacities, r...
A central feature of electricity market reforms involved restructuring monopoly utilities. In the Ge...
It has been argued that having a contract market before the spot market enhances competition (Allaz ...
This paper analyzes the interactions between competitive (wholesale) spot, retail, and forward marke...
This paper analyzes the interactions between competitive (wholesale) spot, retail, and forward marke...
We examine the effects of reorganizing electricity markets on capacity investments, retail prices an...
In theory, competitive electricity markets can provide incentives for efficient investment in genera...
Decentralised electricity systems require effective price and quantity risk management mechanisms, b...
Decentralised electricity systems require effective price and quantity risk management mechanisms, b...
National audienceNone of the far-reaching experiments in electricity industry liberalisation was abl...
Vertical separation of generation from electricity retailing has often been required as a condition ...
We study the role of vertical structure in determining generating capacities and retail prices in th...
This book fills a gap in the existing literature by dealing with several issues linked to long-term ...
This paper characterises the impact of vertical integration on price equilibria and incentives to st...
Long-term contracts for electricity can counter market power and reduce prices in short-term markets...
This paper studies how competition and vertical structure jointly determine generating capacities, r...
A central feature of electricity market reforms involved restructuring monopoly utilities. In the Ge...
It has been argued that having a contract market before the spot market enhances competition (Allaz ...
This paper analyzes the interactions between competitive (wholesale) spot, retail, and forward marke...
This paper analyzes the interactions between competitive (wholesale) spot, retail, and forward marke...
We examine the effects of reorganizing electricity markets on capacity investments, retail prices an...
In theory, competitive electricity markets can provide incentives for efficient investment in genera...