Marginaliseren van godsdienstvrijheid door abstraheren van de religieuze dimensie

markdownabstract**Dutch Abstract:** Binnen liberale democratieën wordt godsdienstvrijheid breed uitgedaagd, waarbij uitdaging synoniem staat voor marginalisering van godsdienst en de constitutionele bescherming ervan. Een bijzonder mechanisme dat in verband met het marginaliseringsproces consequent lijkt te worden ingezet betreft het abstraheren van de religieuze dimensie. Dit mechanisme zet de uitoefening van godsdienstvrijheid onder druk en het past in een bredere tendens om de uiting van godsdienstvrijheid te marginaliseren. **English Abstract:** In modern democracies, which are characterised by separation of church and state, religious freedom is generally considered a fundamental right. In case the practice of this freedom may conflict other legal interests and human rights, there often is a call to adjust its expression, through interventions by substantive criminal law, to the ‘current’ view of a dominant majority. Applying criminal law in defining the extents of religious freedom, and protecting thereby other human rights or legal interests, indicates a particular normative relationship between criminal law and religious freedom. Today this conflict has become more emphatically visible than before, particularly with respect to authentic religious practices that are no longer considered ‘acceptable’, but rather ‘harmful’ and therefore (at least potentially) criminal. This article determines and analyses how criminal law, which, after all, requires consensus and legitimacy, delineates the extents of religious freedom in modern secularised liberal societies