This chapter explores the normative underpinnings of the principal–agent model. These are situated in rousseau’s analysis of the representative democracy and weber’s study of the bureaucracy. Whereas many of their arguments still maintain their value in present-day politics, the empirical reality in which these ideas developed has changed drastically. The rise of alternative forms of public contestation, and above all, the multi-level decision-making setting of the eu, begs the question for which contemporary debates the principal–agent model still holds moral sway. We argue that—while principal–agent analyses can benefit from an explicit normative debate—the model is too reductionist to provide conclusive answers to such debates
The prospect of a Brexit illustrates that the European Union’s legitimacy deficit can have far-reach...
The prospect of a Brexit illustrates that the European Union’s legitimacy deficit can have far-reach...
Objective to consider the conception of reverse delegation when the government acts a principal and ...
This chapter explores the normative underpinnings of the principal–agent model. These are situated i...
Given the omnipresence of delegation and control in the EU, the principal–agent model has become a p...
Given the omnipresence of delegation and control in the EU, the principal–agent model has become a p...
In the 20 years after its introduction, the principal-agent model has seen increasing use to study p...
This book assesses the use and limitations of the principal-agent model in a context of increasingly...
This book assesses the use and limitations of the principal-agent model in a context of increasingly...
Principal–agent analyses have been frequently applied by scholars of the European Union (EU). The mo...
© 2017 European Consortium for Political Research. In the 20 years after its introduction, the princ...
Principal-agent models have been the basis for an extensive set of studies relating bureaucracy to e...
One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, ...
Traditional agency models focus on the conceptual line of delegation running from principal to agent...
© 2007 by SAGE Publications and PACPrincipal-agent modelling has become a very influential way of th...
The prospect of a Brexit illustrates that the European Union’s legitimacy deficit can have far-reach...
The prospect of a Brexit illustrates that the European Union’s legitimacy deficit can have far-reach...
Objective to consider the conception of reverse delegation when the government acts a principal and ...
This chapter explores the normative underpinnings of the principal–agent model. These are situated i...
Given the omnipresence of delegation and control in the EU, the principal–agent model has become a p...
Given the omnipresence of delegation and control in the EU, the principal–agent model has become a p...
In the 20 years after its introduction, the principal-agent model has seen increasing use to study p...
This book assesses the use and limitations of the principal-agent model in a context of increasingly...
This book assesses the use and limitations of the principal-agent model in a context of increasingly...
Principal–agent analyses have been frequently applied by scholars of the European Union (EU). The mo...
© 2017 European Consortium for Political Research. In the 20 years after its introduction, the princ...
Principal-agent models have been the basis for an extensive set of studies relating bureaucracy to e...
One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, ...
Traditional agency models focus on the conceptual line of delegation running from principal to agent...
© 2007 by SAGE Publications and PACPrincipal-agent modelling has become a very influential way of th...
The prospect of a Brexit illustrates that the European Union’s legitimacy deficit can have far-reach...
The prospect of a Brexit illustrates that the European Union’s legitimacy deficit can have far-reach...
Objective to consider the conception of reverse delegation when the government acts a principal and ...