The Electoral Commitment Problem : A quantitative assessment of the impact of constitutional features on post-election conflict

Conflict immediately following elections is a phenomenon rarely studies in its own light. The timing, motivation, and dynamics of post-election conflict is often verydifferent to that in other periods of the electoral cycle. This study seeks to identifyhow certain constitutional features influence the likelihood of post-electionconflict. Based on an adaptation of the ‘credible commitment problem’, I argue thatby reducing the stakes of elections through careful constitutional design, politicalactors can overcome the deep mistrust and uncertainty associated with electoralperiods. The threat of post-election conflict can therefore be mitigated bytempering the rewards for ‘winners’, and consequently softening the blow for‘losers’. By creating a global post-election conflict dataset of national electionsbetween 1989-2012, a series of binary logistic regressions show that proportionalelectoral systems decrease the likelihood of post-election riots and protests, whilstgreater decentralisation and the direct-election of a head of state increase thelikelihood of post-election violence