<p>Panel (a) shows the cooperation level as a function of <i>r</i> for different values of <i>h</i>. Panel (b) shows the cooperation level as a function of <i>h</i> for different values of <i>r</i>. It can be observed that cooperation can evolve even for large value of <i>r</i> in the mode of conditional interaction, and there exist intermediate tolerance ranges leading to the optimal cooperation level. Here, <i>k</i> is set to </p
Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affec...
It is observed that in a repeated public good game with same individuals, free riding by a few indiv...
The evolution of cooperation has been the focus of intense research in the social sciences, natural ...
In the well-mixed prisoner’s dilemma game, individuals are typically assumed to have no choice about...
In the well-mixed prisoner's dilemma game, individuals are typically assumed to have no choice ...
In the well-mixed prisoner's dilemma game, individuals are typically assumed to have no choice about...
We study the emergence of conditional cooperation in the presence of both intra-group and inter-grou...
First published online: 13 May 2021Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because indivi...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the feedback strength for differ...
Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption t...
Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption t...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the fraction of cooperators in the whole population as a function of time for f...
<p>The other parameter settings are <i>K</i> = 0.5 and <i>μ</i> = 10<sup>−4</sup>. As shown in the F...
<p>(a) depicts the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the temptation to defect for the tradi...
Evolutionary approaches have done much to identify the pressures that select for cooperative sentime...
Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affec...
It is observed that in a repeated public good game with same individuals, free riding by a few indiv...
The evolution of cooperation has been the focus of intense research in the social sciences, natural ...
In the well-mixed prisoner’s dilemma game, individuals are typically assumed to have no choice about...
In the well-mixed prisoner's dilemma game, individuals are typically assumed to have no choice ...
In the well-mixed prisoner's dilemma game, individuals are typically assumed to have no choice about...
We study the emergence of conditional cooperation in the presence of both intra-group and inter-grou...
First published online: 13 May 2021Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because indivi...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the feedback strength for differ...
Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption t...
Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption t...
<p>Panel (a) depicts the fraction of cooperators in the whole population as a function of time for f...
<p>The other parameter settings are <i>K</i> = 0.5 and <i>μ</i> = 10<sup>−4</sup>. As shown in the F...
<p>(a) depicts the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the temptation to defect for the tradi...
Evolutionary approaches have done much to identify the pressures that select for cooperative sentime...
Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affec...
It is observed that in a repeated public good game with same individuals, free riding by a few indiv...
The evolution of cooperation has been the focus of intense research in the social sciences, natural ...