Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International Cooperation

Argues that eliminating international institutions is the best way to solve the problem of inadequate national regulation. Private actions that frustrate competition are highlighted to show that the problem of government failure exists at the international level. The nature of competition policy \u26 its potential for abuse are described to point out the inseparability of competition policy \u26 trade policy, as well as difficulties that result from the less transparent nature of competition law. A review of proposals to develop international regimes to accommodate substantive competition law or allocate regulatory jurisdiction emphasizes why such regimes are likely to be unsatisfactory. Considerations that prompt countries to use competition law are addressed, along with additional problems of administration, application, \u26 adaptation presented by international regimes. Long-term incentives to avoid the protection that nations face under conditions of factor mobility are discussed \u26 the empirical literature on trade /development is reviewed to argue in favor of a similar positive correlation between optimal choices of competition policy \u26 economic growth. Areas for further research are suggested. J. Lindrot