Add to ORKGIn this working paper, we present empirical evidence on the determinants of firms\u27 use of executive pensions and deferred compensation, using a large panel of 1300+ firms over 3 years. We find that measures of managerial power and directors\u27 preference for avoiding risk predict the size of pensions, and find little support for the finance literature\u27s claim that pensions are an efficient form of contracting for firms with large debts. We also offer several theoretical reasons to doubt that inside debt such as pensions could serve effectively to align managers\u27 incentives with those of creditors
Executive defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation are known as "inside debt". The reason ...
This paper investigates various incentives determining risk taking strategies of the corporate pensi...
This paper investigates the volatility of defined benefit of pension plans over the period 1999-2006...
In this working paper, we present empirical evidence on the determinants of firms\u27 use of executi...
This dissertation consists of three essays examining issues related to executive inside debt on firm...
<p>Abstract copyright data collection owner.</p>It is widely acknowledged that the behaviour of top ...
Even risky pension sponsors could offer essentially riskless pension promises by contributing a suff...
As managers approach retirement, their career horizons become shorter and they might start to behave...
Using a unique panel dataset on pension funding and asset allocation for large U.S. corporations fro...
This paper investigates the disclosure and provision of defined benefit pensions to chief executive ...
Pension Risk and Corporate Investment: This paper studies the relation of systematic pension risk ...
Inside debt, such as pensions and deferred compensation, constitutes a widely-used form of executive...
This article builds and tests a model of the impact of a firm's bankruptcy probability on its propen...
Firm managers of defined-benefit (DB) pension plan sponsors reveal their primary motives — risk-shif...
Employers offer pension plans for two main reasons; paternalism and skills market competiveness. Rec...
Executive defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation are known as "inside debt". The reason ...
This paper investigates various incentives determining risk taking strategies of the corporate pensi...
This paper investigates the volatility of defined benefit of pension plans over the period 1999-2006...
In this working paper, we present empirical evidence on the determinants of firms\u27 use of executi...
This dissertation consists of three essays examining issues related to executive inside debt on firm...
<p>Abstract copyright data collection owner.</p>It is widely acknowledged that the behaviour of top ...
Even risky pension sponsors could offer essentially riskless pension promises by contributing a suff...
As managers approach retirement, their career horizons become shorter and they might start to behave...
Using a unique panel dataset on pension funding and asset allocation for large U.S. corporations fro...
This paper investigates the disclosure and provision of defined benefit pensions to chief executive ...
Pension Risk and Corporate Investment: This paper studies the relation of systematic pension risk ...
Inside debt, such as pensions and deferred compensation, constitutes a widely-used form of executive...
This article builds and tests a model of the impact of a firm's bankruptcy probability on its propen...
Firm managers of defined-benefit (DB) pension plan sponsors reveal their primary motives — risk-shif...
Employers offer pension plans for two main reasons; paternalism and skills market competiveness. Rec...
Executive defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation are known as "inside debt". The reason ...
This paper investigates various incentives determining risk taking strategies of the corporate pensi...
This paper investigates the volatility of defined benefit of pension plans over the period 1999-2006...