Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment Disclosures

In a criminal justice system where guilty pleas are the norm and trials the rare exception, the issue of how much discovery a defendant is entitled to before allocution has immense significance. This article examines the scope of a prosecutor’s obligation to disclose impeachment information before a guilty plea. This question has polarized the criminal bar and bedeviled the academic community since the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in United States v. Ruiz (2002). A critical feature of the debate has been the enduring schism between a prosecutor’s legal and ethical obligations – a gulf that the American Bar Association recently widened by issuing a controversial opinion interpreting Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) to impose obligations on prosecutors well beyond the requirements of the due process clause. The author addresses the controversial subject of impeachment disclosures from both an institutional and a substantive perspective. A great deal of legal scholarship aims directly at the content of proposed law reform without considering the threshold and pivotal question of what institution is best situated to administer those duties imposed. The author argues that as a matter of institutional competence and legitimacy, the courts are far better equipped to enforce criminal discovery obligations through rules of procedure than bar disciplinary authorities are capable of doing through attorney conduct rules. With regard to the substantive issue - that is, how much impeachment evidence should be turned over by a prosecutor before a guilty plea - the author proposes a categorical approach to impeachment disclosures that will mediate the tension between the defendant’s interest in accurately assessing the strength and weaknesses of the government’s case, and the state’s interest in protecting the privacy and security of potential witnesses