In his paper \u27What we are morally responsible for\u27, Harry Frankfurt claims, in passing, that while the \u27Frankfurt Counterexamples\u27 are counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, they are not counterexamples to th famous Kantian maxim that \u27Ought\u27 implies \u27Can\u27. In an Analysis Paper of a few years ago, David Widerker objected to Frankfurt\u27s claim by arguing that the \u27Ought\u27 implies \u27Can\u27 maxim entails PAP; hence, counterexamples to PAP are counterexamples to the maxim as well
According to Henry J. Frankfurt, the claim that “ought implies can” is taken by many philosophers as...
In an earlier paper in this journal I suggested that the standard argument for theological fatalism ...
Proponents of modern Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples (FSCs) generally accept that we cannot construc...
In his paper \u27What we are morally responsible for\u27, Harry Frankfurt claims, in passing, that w...
In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Re...
This paper examines the position in moral philosophy that Harry Frankfurt calls the Principle of Alt...
According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for w...
One strategy in recent discussions of theological fatalism is to draw on Harry Frankfurt\u27s famous...
In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Re...
The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative po...
The focus of this dissertation is the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), a fundamental prin...
Abstract Greg Janzen has recently criticised my defence of Frankfurt’s counterexample to the Princip...
It’s often said, and with good reason, that we are not told by the way things are how they ought to ...
The most serious challenge to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibili...
This article contends that recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are irrelevant ...
According to Henry J. Frankfurt, the claim that “ought implies can” is taken by many philosophers as...
In an earlier paper in this journal I suggested that the standard argument for theological fatalism ...
Proponents of modern Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples (FSCs) generally accept that we cannot construc...
In his paper \u27What we are morally responsible for\u27, Harry Frankfurt claims, in passing, that w...
In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Re...
This paper examines the position in moral philosophy that Harry Frankfurt calls the Principle of Alt...
According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for w...
One strategy in recent discussions of theological fatalism is to draw on Harry Frankfurt\u27s famous...
In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Re...
The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative po...
The focus of this dissertation is the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), a fundamental prin...
Abstract Greg Janzen has recently criticised my defence of Frankfurt’s counterexample to the Princip...
It’s often said, and with good reason, that we are not told by the way things are how they ought to ...
The most serious challenge to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibili...
This article contends that recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are irrelevant ...
According to Henry J. Frankfurt, the claim that “ought implies can” is taken by many philosophers as...
In an earlier paper in this journal I suggested that the standard argument for theological fatalism ...
Proponents of modern Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples (FSCs) generally accept that we cannot construc...