All About Words: Early Understandings of the Judicial Power in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806

What understanding of the \u27judicial Power would the Founders and their immediate successors possess in regard to statutory interpretation? In this Article, Professor Eskridge explores the background understanding of the judiciary\u27s role in the interpretation of legislative texts, and answers earlier work by scholars like Professor John Manning who have suggested that the separation of powers adopted in the U.S. Constitution mandate an interpretive methodology similar to today\u27s textualism. Reviewing sources such as English precedents, early state court practices, ratifying debates, and the Marshall Court\u27s practices, Eskridge demonstrates that while early statutory interpretation began with the words of the text, it by no means confined its search for meaning to the plain text. He concludes that the early practices, especially the methodology ofJohn Marshall, provide a powerful model, not of an anticipatory textualism, but rather of a sophisticated methodology that knit together text, context, purpose, and democratic and constitutional norms in the service of carrying out the judiciary\u27s constitutional role