Why do we have judicial elections? A democracy without elections for the legislature and executive (or, in parliamentary systems, for the executive as the leadership of the elected legislators), would be simply inconceivable. But no one would deny that eleven of our states, or many other nations, are democracies even though they do not elect judges. It might follow from that irrefutable, fundamental difference between elections for judges and for other offices, that judicial elections should not-or more to the point, need not-be conducted the same as other elections. Before we soar into debate, let us lay a foundation with elements of fact: first, the historical facts about why we have judicial elections; second, how well or poorly those fa...
This Note consists of five Parts. Part II traces the historical development of state judicial electi...
The following remarks suggest that the election system for choosing Washington judges is not, in any...
This dissertation critiques popular elections as a method of judicial selection and retention. Its c...
Why do we have judicial elections? A democracy without elections for the legislature and executive (...
Elections transform the basis of judicial legitimacy. Whereas a permanently appointed judiciary find...
In the United States today the vast majority of states conduct elections in some form or fashion to ...
Judicial elections in the United States have undergone a dramatic transformation. For more than a ce...
Those who are concerned about judicial independence and accountability in the United States quite ri...
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by offering a brief history and background of judici...
Judges, even when popularly elected, are not representatives; they are not agents for their voters, ...
For over two centuries Americans have debated whether judges should be elected or appointed. While t...
One of the most important recent developments in American legal theory is the burgeoning interest in...
Regulating Judicial Elections provides the first accounting of the efficacy and consequences of such...
This Essay critiques the arguments leveled at judicial elections. For each criticism--which I have d...
It is hardly novel to suggest that judicial elections, including retention elections, illustrate pro...
This Note consists of five Parts. Part II traces the historical development of state judicial electi...
The following remarks suggest that the election system for choosing Washington judges is not, in any...
This dissertation critiques popular elections as a method of judicial selection and retention. Its c...
Why do we have judicial elections? A democracy without elections for the legislature and executive (...
Elections transform the basis of judicial legitimacy. Whereas a permanently appointed judiciary find...
In the United States today the vast majority of states conduct elections in some form or fashion to ...
Judicial elections in the United States have undergone a dramatic transformation. For more than a ce...
Those who are concerned about judicial independence and accountability in the United States quite ri...
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by offering a brief history and background of judici...
Judges, even when popularly elected, are not representatives; they are not agents for their voters, ...
For over two centuries Americans have debated whether judges should be elected or appointed. While t...
One of the most important recent developments in American legal theory is the burgeoning interest in...
Regulating Judicial Elections provides the first accounting of the efficacy and consequences of such...
This Essay critiques the arguments leveled at judicial elections. For each criticism--which I have d...
It is hardly novel to suggest that judicial elections, including retention elections, illustrate pro...
This Note consists of five Parts. Part II traces the historical development of state judicial electi...
The following remarks suggest that the election system for choosing Washington judges is not, in any...
This dissertation critiques popular elections as a method of judicial selection and retention. Its c...