Single-Peaked preferences play an important role in the social choice literature. In this paper, we look at necessary and sufficient conditions for aggregated choices to be consistent with a mixture model of single-peaked preferences for a given ordering of the alternatives. These conditions can be tested in time polynomial in the number of choice alternatives. In addition, algorithms are provided which identify the underlying ordering of choice alternatives if the ordering is unknown. These algorithms also run in polynomial time, providing an efficient test for the mixture model of single-peaked preferences
We introduce the domain of preferences that are single-peaked on a circle, which is a generalization...
We consider how to combine the preferences of multiple agents despite the presence of incompleteness...
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters ’ pref-eren...
Single-Peaked preferences play an important role in the social choice literature. In this paper, we ...
Single-Peaked preferences play an important role in the social choice literature. In this paper, we ...
A common way of dealing with the paradoxes of preference aggregation consists in restricting the dom...
In this paper we present algorithms to test a theory of stochastic preferences on binary choice data...
This paper examines combinatorial problems in connection with single-peaked preference orderings on ...
With simple stimuli like amount of sugar in coffee or grade expectations in courses, the preference ...
We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences o...
We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the do-main of single-peaked preferences ...
Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation and voting systems. ...
Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation and voting systems. ...
A mixture model for preferences data, which adequately represents the composite nature of the elicit...
Voting is a general method for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. Each agent ranks all ...
We introduce the domain of preferences that are single-peaked on a circle, which is a generalization...
We consider how to combine the preferences of multiple agents despite the presence of incompleteness...
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters ’ pref-eren...
Single-Peaked preferences play an important role in the social choice literature. In this paper, we ...
Single-Peaked preferences play an important role in the social choice literature. In this paper, we ...
A common way of dealing with the paradoxes of preference aggregation consists in restricting the dom...
In this paper we present algorithms to test a theory of stochastic preferences on binary choice data...
This paper examines combinatorial problems in connection with single-peaked preference orderings on ...
With simple stimuli like amount of sugar in coffee or grade expectations in courses, the preference ...
We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences o...
We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the do-main of single-peaked preferences ...
Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation and voting systems. ...
Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation and voting systems. ...
A mixture model for preferences data, which adequately represents the composite nature of the elicit...
Voting is a general method for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. Each agent ranks all ...
We introduce the domain of preferences that are single-peaked on a circle, which is a generalization...
We consider how to combine the preferences of multiple agents despite the presence of incompleteness...
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters ’ pref-eren...