<p> is fixed to the corresponding value on the x-axis and the initial contribution in period for all agents of a group is randomly drawn form a uniform distribution in . A value of corresponds to an optimal value of the propensity to punish associated to a minimum of the global punishment expenditure.</p
Peer-punishment is effective in promoting cooperation, but the costs associated with punishing defec...
<p>In each of the three periods, participants played one round of public good followed by five round...
As one of the mechanisms that are supposed to explain the evolution of cooperation among unrelated i...
<p> is fixed to the corresponding value on the x-axis and the initial contribution for all agents ...
<p>The error bars indicate standard error around the mean. The straight line crossing zero shows th...
Cooperation among unrelated individuals is pervasive in human societies, while natural selection fav...
<p>The error bars indicate the standard error around the mean. The straight line crossing zero with ...
In prisoner’s dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote coopera...
Abstract. Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order fr...
<p>This figure plots the average willingness to punish of the last 500 generations of each simulatio...
<p>The values correspond to the population's median of the individual values as a function of time ...
In prisoner's dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote coopera...
<p>Participants could either contribute into the public good, C, or defect, D. Hence, in CD a contri...
Punishing defectors is an important means of stabilizing cooperation. When levels of cooperation an...
<p>Propensity to punish as a function of the punishment efficiency (continuous line) for a fixed gr...
Peer-punishment is effective in promoting cooperation, but the costs associated with punishing defec...
<p>In each of the three periods, participants played one round of public good followed by five round...
As one of the mechanisms that are supposed to explain the evolution of cooperation among unrelated i...
<p> is fixed to the corresponding value on the x-axis and the initial contribution for all agents ...
<p>The error bars indicate standard error around the mean. The straight line crossing zero shows th...
Cooperation among unrelated individuals is pervasive in human societies, while natural selection fav...
<p>The error bars indicate the standard error around the mean. The straight line crossing zero with ...
In prisoner’s dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote coopera...
Abstract. Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order fr...
<p>This figure plots the average willingness to punish of the last 500 generations of each simulatio...
<p>The values correspond to the population's median of the individual values as a function of time ...
In prisoner's dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote coopera...
<p>Participants could either contribute into the public good, C, or defect, D. Hence, in CD a contri...
Punishing defectors is an important means of stabilizing cooperation. When levels of cooperation an...
<p>Propensity to punish as a function of the punishment efficiency (continuous line) for a fixed gr...
Peer-punishment is effective in promoting cooperation, but the costs associated with punishing defec...
<p>In each of the three periods, participants played one round of public good followed by five round...
As one of the mechanisms that are supposed to explain the evolution of cooperation among unrelated i...