<p>Propensity to punish as a function of the punishment efficiency (continuous line) for a fixed group size and as a function of the group size (dashed line with cross markers) for a fixed .</p
<p>The figure demonstrates how punishment helps in adapting to conflict, for low punishment-sensitiv...
<p>(a) and (b) show the relationship between the cooperation level of the opponent (horizontal axis)...
<p>The horizontal continuous line corresponds to the median value of the empirically observed propen...
<p>Sensitivity of as a function of a relative change of the contributions for a group size of , a ...
<p>The frequencies of particular types of punishers and types of punishments by malicious players.</...
<p>Top: Intermediate punishment parameter settings ([0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]): Counts of caste 2 2 signa...
<p>Top: Intermediate punishment parameter settings ([0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]): Counts of caste 0 0 signa...
<p>Top: Intermediate punishment parameter settings ([0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]): Counts of caste 2 0 signa...
<p>The error bars indicate standard error around the mean. The straight line crossing zero shows th...
<p>Top: Intermediate punishment parameter settings ([0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]): Counts of caste 0 2 signa...
<p>Pictures used along the descriptions of the punishment targets in every condition (Experiment 1)....
<p>Means and Standard Deviations for entitativity perceptions and support for punishment as a functi...
<p>Power achieved for three sizes of the effect, for between factors and repeated measures.</p
<p> is fixed to the corresponding value on the x-axis and the initial contribution in period for a...
Graph demonstrating the limits of resistance that were evaluated in each set in each group.</p
<p>The figure demonstrates how punishment helps in adapting to conflict, for low punishment-sensitiv...
<p>(a) and (b) show the relationship between the cooperation level of the opponent (horizontal axis)...
<p>The horizontal continuous line corresponds to the median value of the empirically observed propen...
<p>Sensitivity of as a function of a relative change of the contributions for a group size of , a ...
<p>The frequencies of particular types of punishers and types of punishments by malicious players.</...
<p>Top: Intermediate punishment parameter settings ([0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]): Counts of caste 2 2 signa...
<p>Top: Intermediate punishment parameter settings ([0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]): Counts of caste 0 0 signa...
<p>Top: Intermediate punishment parameter settings ([0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]): Counts of caste 2 0 signa...
<p>The error bars indicate standard error around the mean. The straight line crossing zero shows th...
<p>Top: Intermediate punishment parameter settings ([0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]): Counts of caste 0 2 signa...
<p>Pictures used along the descriptions of the punishment targets in every condition (Experiment 1)....
<p>Means and Standard Deviations for entitativity perceptions and support for punishment as a functi...
<p>Power achieved for three sizes of the effect, for between factors and repeated measures.</p
<p> is fixed to the corresponding value on the x-axis and the initial contribution in period for a...
Graph demonstrating the limits of resistance that were evaluated in each set in each group.</p
<p>The figure demonstrates how punishment helps in adapting to conflict, for low punishment-sensitiv...
<p>(a) and (b) show the relationship between the cooperation level of the opponent (horizontal axis)...
<p>The horizontal continuous line corresponds to the median value of the empirically observed propen...
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