Publication date
February 2015
DOIAbstract
<p>The expectation payoff matrix of our generalized prisoner’s dilemma game—the full version. The value in the matrix is the payoff of the row strategy.</p
<p>The expectation payoff matrix of our generalized prisoner’s dilemma game—the full version. The value in the matrix is the payoff of the row strategy.</p
<p>Pay-off matrix for the standard trust game (see Bolton et al., 2004a, p. 188).</p
<p>Following many interactions, a portion <i>r</i> occurs with a like-individual, and only the porti...
<p>A general payoff matrix for reciprocal altruism where <i>w</i> is the probability that an individ...
<p>The expectation payoff matrix of our generalized prisoner’s dilemma game—the normalised version. ...
<p>The expectation payoff matrix of our generalized prisoner’s dilemma game—the weak version</p
The payoff matrix of the two-stage game can be constructed based on the payoffs of the first stage (...
<p>The 2×2 matrix based on the combination of both players’ selection makes four different patterns ...
<p><i>Note</i>. <i>T</i> = 5, <i>R</i> = 3, <i>P</i> = 1, <i>S</i> = 0</p><p>Payoff Matrix for the P...
<p>Numbers in each cell are payoffs for both players, with player A’s payoff listed first in each pa...
<p>The payoffs refer to ‘ALL’ the prize-fund, ‘HALF’ the prize-fund, or ‘ZERO’, i.e. £0.</p><p>The p...
<p>Numerical values for Prisoner’s Dilemma are chosen to be comparable with Ultimatum Game, with the...
<p>The prisoner's dilemma pay-off matrix: (C) means cooperate and (D) means defect, (P1) is particip...
<p>The entries in the matrix refer to the payoffs of player A. The benefit of cooperation (<i>b</i>)...
<p><i>Note</i>. <i>T</i> = 50, <i>R</i> = 1, <i>P</i> = –1, <i>S</i> = –50</p><p>Payoff Matrix for a...
<p>Three conditions hold for social dilemmas: 1) <i>a>d</i>, 2) a>(<i>b+c</i>)/2, and 3) <i>c>a</i>....
<p>Pay-off matrix for the standard trust game (see Bolton et al., 2004a, p. 188).</p
<p>Following many interactions, a portion <i>r</i> occurs with a like-individual, and only the porti...
<p>A general payoff matrix for reciprocal altruism where <i>w</i> is the probability that an individ...
<p>The expectation payoff matrix of our generalized prisoner’s dilemma game—the normalised version. ...
<p>The expectation payoff matrix of our generalized prisoner’s dilemma game—the weak version</p
The payoff matrix of the two-stage game can be constructed based on the payoffs of the first stage (...
<p>The 2×2 matrix based on the combination of both players’ selection makes four different patterns ...
<p><i>Note</i>. <i>T</i> = 5, <i>R</i> = 3, <i>P</i> = 1, <i>S</i> = 0</p><p>Payoff Matrix for the P...
<p>Numbers in each cell are payoffs for both players, with player A’s payoff listed first in each pa...
<p>The payoffs refer to ‘ALL’ the prize-fund, ‘HALF’ the prize-fund, or ‘ZERO’, i.e. £0.</p><p>The p...
<p>Numerical values for Prisoner’s Dilemma are chosen to be comparable with Ultimatum Game, with the...
<p>The prisoner's dilemma pay-off matrix: (C) means cooperate and (D) means defect, (P1) is particip...
<p>The entries in the matrix refer to the payoffs of player A. The benefit of cooperation (<i>b</i>)...
<p><i>Note</i>. <i>T</i> = 50, <i>R</i> = 1, <i>P</i> = –1, <i>S</i> = –50</p><p>Payoff Matrix for a...
<p>Three conditions hold for social dilemmas: 1) <i>a>d</i>, 2) a>(<i>b+c</i>)/2, and 3) <i>c>a</i>....
<p>Pay-off matrix for the standard trust game (see Bolton et al., 2004a, p. 188).</p
<p>Following many interactions, a portion <i>r</i> occurs with a like-individual, and only the porti...
<p>A general payoff matrix for reciprocal altruism where <i>w</i> is the probability that an individ...
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