<p>(a) Time evolution of average characteristic parameter <i>CP</i>. (b) The number of dead individuals as a function of resource rate <i>c</i> for different temptation to defection <i>b</i>. (c) The average characteristic parameter as a function of resource rate <i>c</i> for different temptation to defection <i>b</i>. (d) The standard deviation of <i>CP</i> for the system a function of resource rate <i>c</i> for different <i>b</i>. Each data point is an average of 100 independent realizations.</p
We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game among individuals endowed with adaptively inte...
<p>Results are presented for the aspiration parameters (solid lines...
<p>The limit recovers the neutral process (no interactions) whereas for individuals hardly update ...
<p>(a) The number of dead individuals on the <i>c</i> − <i>b</i> parameter plane. (b) The average ch...
<p>(left) Dependence of on for various values of (see legend) for on a square lattice. (right) ...
<p>The panels for the first two rows denote the distribution of cooperators and defectors for the up...
<p><b>, </b><b>on a </b><b>lattice.</b> The lines give trajectories for the (i) average density of c...
<p>Parameter choices are , , and simulations were performed on a lattice. Trajectories are average...
(a) Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators Fc for different strengths of the preferential sel...
<p>(a) Fraction of cooperators as a function of temptation to defect for population density and (...
<p>Left panel depicts the density of cooperators in dependence on the fract...
<p>Results are presented for the traditional version (dotted line) and inferring reputation mechanis...
<p>The left three panels (a, b, c) depict the time course of evolution under the case <b>I</b>, wher...
<p>The update rules are (A) imitation and (B) death-birth, and each process has for a selection inte...
<p>All simulations were conducted on a square lattice of size with individuals, half of which are ...
We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game among individuals endowed with adaptively inte...
<p>Results are presented for the aspiration parameters (solid lines...
<p>The limit recovers the neutral process (no interactions) whereas for individuals hardly update ...
<p>(a) The number of dead individuals on the <i>c</i> − <i>b</i> parameter plane. (b) The average ch...
<p>(left) Dependence of on for various values of (see legend) for on a square lattice. (right) ...
<p>The panels for the first two rows denote the distribution of cooperators and defectors for the up...
<p><b>, </b><b>on a </b><b>lattice.</b> The lines give trajectories for the (i) average density of c...
<p>Parameter choices are , , and simulations were performed on a lattice. Trajectories are average...
(a) Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators Fc for different strengths of the preferential sel...
<p>(a) Fraction of cooperators as a function of temptation to defect for population density and (...
<p>Left panel depicts the density of cooperators in dependence on the fract...
<p>Results are presented for the traditional version (dotted line) and inferring reputation mechanis...
<p>The left three panels (a, b, c) depict the time course of evolution under the case <b>I</b>, wher...
<p>The update rules are (A) imitation and (B) death-birth, and each process has for a selection inte...
<p>All simulations were conducted on a square lattice of size with individuals, half of which are ...
We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game among individuals endowed with adaptively inte...
<p>Results are presented for the aspiration parameters (solid lines...
<p>The limit recovers the neutral process (no interactions) whereas for individuals hardly update ...