A Study on Reasons for the Collapse of the Pahlavi's Army in the Face of the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran

<p>the army at least until the Islamic Revolution was able to present itself as an efficient and reliable power at the time of Pahlavi father and son. Especially after the coup of 19 August 1953 the indisputable dominance of Mohammad Reza Shah on the army caused the army to become his private property. But despite all the attention of the Shah to army, the army failed to demonstrate any initiative during the Islamic Revolution. In this paper, the authors discuss the question of why army takes such a stance and does not take any initiative in the face of the revolution. The authors in a descriptive-analytical study concluded that the most important factor involved in this issue was the nature of the Pahlavi regime and the subsequent regulatory policies of the Shah to control the army, which resulted in the depletion of independence from the army and its inability to take any initiative during the Revolution.