Towards peace in the Korean Peninsula: nuclear deterrence and alternative security approaches

Given their catastrophic destructive power, the existence and use of nuclear weapons have found validity primarily in the concept of ‘deterrence’, i.e., the restraint of nuclear war, with political realism as the main philosophical foundation. Far from its basic aim of ‘war-prevention’, however, nuclear deterrence has involved in theory and in practice many risks of ‘war-fighting’, and thus various alternative ideas have been proposed. <p>Since their emergence in 1948, South-North Korean relations have been marked by a series of conflicts and tensions, including a fratricidal hot war. Further, with the U.S. strategy of nuclear deterrence, the Korean peninsula has long been a highly inflammable potential nuclear theatre which could ignite even a third world war among nuclear-armed big powers. Moreover, South Korean attempts to develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s and recent controversies surrounding the North Korean nuclear potential have raised even the possibility of the two Koreas’ own nuclearisation.</p> <p>In order to contribute to removal or significant reduction of the danger of nuclear war in the Korean peninsula and of South-North Korean military tensions and conflicts, this study first examines problems related to the realist security paradigm and nuclear deterrence system. Subsequently, the origins of the division of the Korean peninsula and major factors which have sustained South-North Korean confrontation are examined. And while changes, and the conflict situation, in and around the Korean peninsula after the Cold War are considered, the adequacy and necessity of establishment of nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) and a non-provocative defence (NPD) system are explored as specific alternative security frameworks to increase peace in the peninsula.