The phenomenon of oligarchy in Russia and its impact on Russian transition

Nowadays any analysis of Russian economy is incomplete without taking into account the phenomenon of oligarchy. Russian oligarchs appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union and are represented by wealthy businessmen who control a huge part of natural resources enterprises and have a big political influence. Oligarchs’ shares in some natural resources industries reach even 70-80%. Their role in Russian economy is big without any doubts, however there has been very little economic analysis done. The aim of this work is to examine Russian oligarchy on micro and macro levels, its role in Russia’s transition and the possible positive and negative outcomes from this phenomenon. For this purpose the work presents two theoretical models. The first part of this thesis work examines the role of oligarchs on micro level, concentrating on the question whether the oligarchs can be more productive owners than other types of owners. To answer the question this part presents a model based on the article 'Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence' by Y. Gorodnichenko and Y. Grygorenko. It is followed by empirical test based on the works of S. Guriev and A. Rachinsky. The model predicts oligarchs to invest more in the productivity of their enterprises and have higher returns on capital, therefore be more productive owners. According to the empirical test, oligarchs were found to outperform other types of owners, however it is not defined whether the productivity gains offset losses in tax revenue. The second part of the work concentrates on the role of oligarchy on macro level. More precisely, it examines the assumption that the depression after 1998 crises in Russia was caused by the oligarchs’ behavior. This part presents a theoretical model based on the article 'A macroeconomic model of Russian transition: The role of oligarchic property rights' by S. Braguinsky and R. Myerson, where the special type of property rights is introduced. After the 1998 crises oligarchs started to invest all their resources abroad to protect themselves from political risks, which resulted in the long depression phase. The macroeconomic model shows, that better protection of property rights (smaller political risk) or/and higher outside investing could reduce the depression. Taking into account this result, the government policy can change the oligarchs’ behavior to be more beneficial for the Russian economy and make the transition faster