We contribute to the debate over the effectiveness of elections in motivating incumbents to perform well. We show that with endogenous political competition the effectiveness of democracy in disciplining officials can be largely diminished.<br/
166 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1980.One of the fundamental proble...
We examine the conditions under which societal conflicts are peacefully processed by competitive ele...
1. Introduction 2. Political Institutions and Economic Performance 2.1. Democracy, Innovation and Gr...
We combine the well-established models of political agency and representative democracy to revisit t...
It is sometimes argued that political competition yields benefits to the citizens just as competitio...
It is sometimes argued that political competition yields benefits to the citizens just as competitio...
What is themarginal effect of competitiveness on the power of electoral incentives? Addressing this ...
In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters’ interests,...
This article examines why democratic competition sometimes fails to curb govern-mental corruption. W...
Elections are the “instruments of democracy” so long as voters hold incumbents accountable for their...
Economic models of politics usually assume that all politicians maximize their narrow self-interest,...
Elections are thought to improve voter welfare through two channels: effective accountability (i.e.,...
Elections discipline and select politicians. When politicians di¤er in their motivation, these two r...
Abstract: This article discusses the relation between corruption and accountability, showing that th...
In the last decades democracy spreads in many parts of the world, and this generates several questio...
166 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1980.One of the fundamental proble...
We examine the conditions under which societal conflicts are peacefully processed by competitive ele...
1. Introduction 2. Political Institutions and Economic Performance 2.1. Democracy, Innovation and Gr...
We combine the well-established models of political agency and representative democracy to revisit t...
It is sometimes argued that political competition yields benefits to the citizens just as competitio...
It is sometimes argued that political competition yields benefits to the citizens just as competitio...
What is themarginal effect of competitiveness on the power of electoral incentives? Addressing this ...
In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters’ interests,...
This article examines why democratic competition sometimes fails to curb govern-mental corruption. W...
Elections are the “instruments of democracy” so long as voters hold incumbents accountable for their...
Economic models of politics usually assume that all politicians maximize their narrow self-interest,...
Elections are thought to improve voter welfare through two channels: effective accountability (i.e.,...
Elections discipline and select politicians. When politicians di¤er in their motivation, these two r...
Abstract: This article discusses the relation between corruption and accountability, showing that th...
In the last decades democracy spreads in many parts of the world, and this generates several questio...
166 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1980.One of the fundamental proble...
We examine the conditions under which societal conflicts are peacefully processed by competitive ele...
1. Introduction 2. Political Institutions and Economic Performance 2.1. Democracy, Innovation and Gr...
DOI
Add to ORKG