A study of Institutional Design on Government Procurement Accompanying Development in Multi-agent Simulation

完全競争市場の対極にある開発・生産をともなう政府調達は，個別契約によらざるをえない．政府調達者と企業間の開発・生産に関する情報の非対称性は，政府調達者にとって適正価格での契約を阻害し，また企業にとって「談合」等のモラルハザードの誘因となる．情報の非対称性を解決するため，一定ルールの下で各企業の原価情報を公開し，情報を共有することが有効な手段である．本論文では，政府調達者および複数企業からなるマルチエージェントモデルを構成し，適切な大域的情報の与え方として，原価情報の提示方法およびタイミング等について提案する．このモデルは，協調行動を誘発し，政府および企業にとってWin-Win関係を築く可能性をシュミレーションにより検証し，多品種開発少量生産の制度設計に貢献できる可能性を示した．Government procurements involving development and production, which are positioned opposite to fully competitive market, have to be based on individual contracts. The asymmetry of information on development and production between government procurers and companies suffocates the contract with reasonable price for government procurers, and is apt to lead to moral hazards such as “Dango”, or collusive tendering among companies. In order to solve the problem of information asymmetry, it would be an effective means to share the competitive cost information by opening the cost information of each company under some rules. In this article, based on a multi-agent model composed of government procurer and multiple companies, we propose a framework of information presentation such as how to present the cost and other related information, or the timing of disclosure. We studied the possibility of this model to prompt coordinated action, and build the win-win relationships between the government and companies using the multi-agent simulation, and showed the possibility of the contribution to designing procurement system for development systems of small-batch production