Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and events in virtue of nomological relations between properties of these individuals and events. Such views fail to take into account the consequences of the fact that in general the properties of individuals and events will depend upon mechanisms that realize those properties. In this paper I attempt to rectify this failure, and in so doing to provide an account of the causal relevance of higher-level properties. I do this by critiquing one prominent model of higher-level properties – Kim’s functional model of reduction – and contrasting it with a mechanistic approach to higher-level properties and causation
One of Glennan’s ([1996]) most prominent contributions to the new mechanist debate consists in his r...
Many contemporary philosophers are drawn to a doctrine of causal fundamentalism. This doctrine has ...
This essay advocates a “functional” approach to causation and causal reasoning: these are to be unde...
Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and eve...
Mechanism is undoubtedly a causal concept, in the sense that ordinary definitions and philosophical ...
According to the new mechanistic approach, an acting entity is at a lower mechanistic level than ano...
In this paper I offer an analysis of causation based upon a theory of mechanisms – complex systems w...
This paper describes an alternative to currently dominant philosophical approaches to the metaphysic...
[From the introduction]Contemporary trends in philosophy of mind have galvanized non-reductive physi...
The thesis addresses the nature of causation. It is argued that causation exists and is as local as ...
Any theory of explanation must capture the intimate connection between explanation and causation, or...
I argue that high level causal relationships are often more fundamental than low level causal relati...
This paper details the ontological and epistemic character of activties that occur in mechanisms. It...
According to causal realism, causation is a fundamental feature of the world, consisting in the fact...
Conceptions of mechanisms due to Glennan (1996; 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Bechtel ...
One of Glennan’s ([1996]) most prominent contributions to the new mechanist debate consists in his r...
Many contemporary philosophers are drawn to a doctrine of causal fundamentalism. This doctrine has ...
This essay advocates a “functional” approach to causation and causal reasoning: these are to be unde...
Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and eve...
Mechanism is undoubtedly a causal concept, in the sense that ordinary definitions and philosophical ...
According to the new mechanistic approach, an acting entity is at a lower mechanistic level than ano...
In this paper I offer an analysis of causation based upon a theory of mechanisms – complex systems w...
This paper describes an alternative to currently dominant philosophical approaches to the metaphysic...
[From the introduction]Contemporary trends in philosophy of mind have galvanized non-reductive physi...
The thesis addresses the nature of causation. It is argued that causation exists and is as local as ...
Any theory of explanation must capture the intimate connection between explanation and causation, or...
I argue that high level causal relationships are often more fundamental than low level causal relati...
This paper details the ontological and epistemic character of activties that occur in mechanisms. It...
According to causal realism, causation is a fundamental feature of the world, consisting in the fact...
Conceptions of mechanisms due to Glennan (1996; 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Bechtel ...
One of Glennan’s ([1996]) most prominent contributions to the new mechanist debate consists in his r...
Many contemporary philosophers are drawn to a doctrine of causal fundamentalism. This doctrine has ...
This essay advocates a “functional” approach to causation and causal reasoning: these are to be unde...