The sleeping beauty problem raises the question of how changes in self-locating beliefs should affect our beliefs about the world. I argue that the responses to the sleeping beauty problem that have been advocated in the literature lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. In light of this, I argue that we should adopt a different account of the dynamics of de se beliefs
What kind of thing do you believe when you believe that you are in a certain place, that it is a cer...
Analyses of the Sleeping Beauty Problem are polarised between those advocating the “1/2 view” (“half...
A number of cases involving self-locating beliefs have been discussed in the Bayesian literature. I ...
The sleeping beauty problem raises the question of how changes in self-locating beliefs should affec...
The way a rational agent changes her belief in certain propositions/hypotheses in the light of new e...
How can self-locating propositions be integrated into normal patterns of belief revision? Puzzles su...
Reasoning that takes into account self-locating evidence in apparently plausible ways sometimes yiel...
A number of cases involving self-locating beliefs have been discussed in the Bayesian literature. I ...
I defend a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account both the impact of new evidence...
About a decade ago, Adam Elga introduced philosophers to an intriguing puzzle. In it, Sleeping Beaut...
ABSTRACT: The Sleeping Beauty Problem is shown to be misconceived and therefore incoherent. A model...
How can self-locating propositions be integrated into normal patterns of belief revision? Puzzles s...
About a decade ago, Adam Elga introduced philosophers to an intriguing puzzle. In it, Sleeping Beaut...
What kind of thing do you believe when you believe that you are in a certain place, that it is a cer...
Analyses of the Sleeping Beauty Problem are polarised between those advocating the “1/2 view” (“half...
A number of cases involving self-locating beliefs have been discussed in the Bayesian literature. I ...
The sleeping beauty problem raises the question of how changes in self-locating beliefs should affec...
The way a rational agent changes her belief in certain propositions/hypotheses in the light of new e...
How can self-locating propositions be integrated into normal patterns of belief revision? Puzzles su...
Reasoning that takes into account self-locating evidence in apparently plausible ways sometimes yiel...
A number of cases involving self-locating beliefs have been discussed in the Bayesian literature. I ...
I defend a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account both the impact of new evidence...
About a decade ago, Adam Elga introduced philosophers to an intriguing puzzle. In it, Sleeping Beaut...
ABSTRACT: The Sleeping Beauty Problem is shown to be misconceived and therefore incoherent. A model...
How can self-locating propositions be integrated into normal patterns of belief revision? Puzzles s...
About a decade ago, Adam Elga introduced philosophers to an intriguing puzzle. In it, Sleeping Beaut...
What kind of thing do you believe when you believe that you are in a certain place, that it is a cer...
Analyses of the Sleeping Beauty Problem are polarised between those advocating the “1/2 view” (“half...
A number of cases involving self-locating beliefs have been discussed in the Bayesian literature. I ...