Add to ORKGA new characterization of a solution concept for the generalized game, a cooperative defined on the set system is proposed. This solution corresponds to the Shapley value for classical cooperative game. We give a new understandable axiomatization of a value of the generalized game in the sense that is related closely to the one of the original Shapley value
The paper is devoted to the Shapley value for cooperative games in generalized characteristic functi...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU g...
peer reviewedIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is...
A new characterization of a solution concept for the generalized game, a cooperative defined on the ...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is ...
We show that for every cooperative game a corresponding set game can be defined, called the standard...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
Abstract. A family of solution values is derived for n–person, cooperative, transferable utility gam...
Motivated by a case of discrimination against some particular players happened in the real world, we...
AbstractIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is an e...
In this note, we discuss two solutions for cooperative transferable utility games, namely the Shaple...
In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomat...
The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts of cooperative game theory is defined an...
The paper is devoted to the Shapley value for cooperative games in generalized characteristic functi...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU g...
peer reviewedIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is...
A new characterization of a solution concept for the generalized game, a cooperative defined on the ...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is ...
We show that for every cooperative game a corresponding set game can be defined, called the standard...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
Abstract. A family of solution values is derived for n–person, cooperative, transferable utility gam...
Motivated by a case of discrimination against some particular players happened in the real world, we...
AbstractIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is an e...
In this note, we discuss two solutions for cooperative transferable utility games, namely the Shaple...
In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomat...
The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts of cooperative game theory is defined an...
The paper is devoted to the Shapley value for cooperative games in generalized characteristic functi...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU g...
peer reviewedIn the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is...