Deleuze, difference and the critique of identity

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to digital@library.tamu.edu, referencing the URI of the item.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-82).Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze is a critical philosophy that aims at examining and articulating the irrationality that underpins all rational thought. In that regard, this thesis aims to outline and clarify the Deleuzean critique of the representational thinking introduced by Platonism and perfected by Hegelianism, insofar as Deleuze recognizes the play of difference at the heart of their representational philosophies. Therefore, the Deleuzean critique of western thought takes as its aim the nav̐e assumption that Identity rather than Difference is at the heart of Being. In Plato and Hegel "philosophy" is characterized as the comprehension of reality. These thinkers promote epistemological concerns, such as knowing "properly" and "correctly," over and above the creative aspect of thought that Deleuze argues gives rise to such philosophies of knowledge. Against such representational thinking that posits Identity as the means to comprehending reality, Deleuze argues that when studied carefully one recognizes that prior to all comprehension, in the instant, thought "makes a difference." Thus, for Deleuze, the differential nature of thought provides that which makes possible the sort of conceptual thinking that Plato and Hegel proffer. What he clarifies is that representational thought is itself not grounded by an identity, but rather by a difference through which an identity can be produced