Discourse Ethics: a pragmatic justification for Haberma's moral theory

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to digital@library.tamu.edu, referencing the URI of the item.Includes bibliographical references: p.77-81.Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.Since the publication of Jurgen Habermas'essay "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification," Habermas'form of cognitive moral proceduralism has been met with a host of criticisms originating from within both the Analytic and Continental philosophical traditions. Most of these criticisms, I contend, fail philosophically because they either do not consider critical elements of Habermas' extensive philosophical corpus or else force one to maintain a philosophically problematic position concerning the resolution of moral problems. In this thesis, I will first elucidate in chapter II the salient features of Habermas' notes for the construction of his cognitive proceduralism, what he calls Moralitdt. Then, in chapter III, I will show how this form of moral discourse can meet objections to the particular philosophical tradition from within which Habermas is working (communicative rationality) and against attempts to derive a workable moral theory from within it. In chapter IV, I will provide a further analytic explication of the moral theory Habermas envisages, drawing in part from his other philosophical works on ethics. Having defended philosophically this further explication of his moral theory, in chapter V I will then provide a defense of Habermas' theoretical bifurcation of Moralitdt from Sittlichkeit, or an ethical/existential form of discourse, against general neoHegelian/neo-Aristotelian/conu-nunitarian objections and provide an argument for Moralitdt's philosophical and meta-philosophical independence from Sittlichkeit. Finally, in chapter VI, I will demonstrate how Moralitiit, when applied to practical problems, is a tenable moral theory suitable for use by normal, reflective individuals. I hope, therefore, to have defended the plausibility of Habermas' particular moral theory and its theoretical independence from theories of the "good life," thereby also his bifurcation of Moralitdt and Sittlichkeit