A Christian philosophical response to the problem of evil

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to digital@library.tamu.edu, referencing the URI of the item.Includes bibliographical references.The problem of evil has been raised as a problem for any monotheist who has traditional beliefs about God. The belief that God exists and is omniscient) omnipotent, and omnibenevolent has been claimed to be inconsistent with the existence of evil. Though philosophical theists have provided successful defenses against the problem of evil, few if any, have given an adequate explanation of the existence of evil that is considered plausible on a specific belief system. In this thesis I explore the contributions that Christian theism makes toward resolving the problem of evil. I divide the problem into four areas and argue that the origin of evil must be addressed if an adequate response to the problem of evil is to be identified. I also argue that since the existence of evil is to be expected on a traditional Christian belief system, inductive arguments that claim the existence of evil makes it improbable that the Christian God exists fail