The paper discusses the view of Franklin Miller and Robert Truog that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment causes death and so is a form of killing. I reject that view. I argue that even if we think there is no morally relevant difference between allowing a patient to die and killing her (itself a controversial view), it does not follow that allowing to die is a form of killing. I then argue that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is properly classified as allowing the patient to die rather than as killing her. Once this is accepted, the law cannot be criticised for inconsistency by holding, as it does, that it is lawful to withdraw life-sustaining treatment but unlawful to give patients a lethal injection
On this issue intuitions seem to lead in opposite directions. On the one hand, we confront examples ...
The purpose of this paper was to prove that there was no moral difference between killing and lettin...
This article examines Finnis' and Keown's claim that the intention/foresight distinction should be u...
There is a clear legal distinction in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States between w...
In this paper, we argue that a defence of the moral equivalence of withholding and withdrawing life-...
This paper examines the recent prominent view in medical ethics that withdrawing life-sustaining tre...
James Rachels’s distinction between killing and letting die maintains that there is morally no diffe...
Withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining treatment tends to be very challenging for health care ...
Withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining treatment tends to be very challenging for health care ...
Traditional medical ethics and law draw a sharp distinction between allowing a patient to die and he...
The purpose of this review is to prove that there is no moral difference between killing and letting...
This chapter resolves a long-standing debate. It examines what has been called the Equivalence Thesi...
We are all called to make moral decisions, not only about preserving life and health, but also about...
Many deaths in intensive care units are preceded by decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustainin...
A physician decides not to prolong the life of a terminal patient. What are the legal consequences? ...
On this issue intuitions seem to lead in opposite directions. On the one hand, we confront examples ...
The purpose of this paper was to prove that there was no moral difference between killing and lettin...
This article examines Finnis' and Keown's claim that the intention/foresight distinction should be u...
There is a clear legal distinction in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States between w...
In this paper, we argue that a defence of the moral equivalence of withholding and withdrawing life-...
This paper examines the recent prominent view in medical ethics that withdrawing life-sustaining tre...
James Rachels’s distinction between killing and letting die maintains that there is morally no diffe...
Withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining treatment tends to be very challenging for health care ...
Withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining treatment tends to be very challenging for health care ...
Traditional medical ethics and law draw a sharp distinction between allowing a patient to die and he...
The purpose of this review is to prove that there is no moral difference between killing and letting...
This chapter resolves a long-standing debate. It examines what has been called the Equivalence Thesi...
We are all called to make moral decisions, not only about preserving life and health, but also about...
Many deaths in intensive care units are preceded by decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustainin...
A physician decides not to prolong the life of a terminal patient. What are the legal consequences? ...
On this issue intuitions seem to lead in opposite directions. On the one hand, we confront examples ...
The purpose of this paper was to prove that there was no moral difference between killing and lettin...
This article examines Finnis' and Keown's claim that the intention/foresight distinction should be u...