Statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime and corporate disclosure behaviour : does corporate governance matter?

Since 1 December 2002, the New Zealand Exchange’s (NZX) continuous disclosure listing rules have operated with statutory backing. To test the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime, we compare the change in quantity of market announcements (overall, non-routine, non-procedural and external) released to the NZX before and after the introduction of statutory backing. We also extend our study in investigating whether the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime is diminished or augmented by corporate governance mechanisms including board size, providing separate roles for CEO and Chairman, board independence, board gender diversity and audit committee independence. Our findings provide a qualified support for the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime regarding the quantity of market disclosures. There is strong evidence that the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime was augmented by providing separate roles for CEO and Chairman, board gender diversity and audit committee independence, and diminished by board size. In addition, there is significant evidence that share price queries do impact corporate disclosure behaviour and this impact is significantly influenced by corporate governance mechanisms. Our findings provide important implications for corporate regulators in their quest for a superior disclosure regime