Add to ORKGThis paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cournot market. It is shown that a manager interested in output expansion exerts higher R&D efforts, yielding productive efficiency as compared to the performance of a strictly profit-seeking firm. This may ultimately yield monopoly power for the managerial firm, if technological spillovers in the industry are low enough
In this Note we consider an economy composed by two firms; a leader and a follower, that invest in R...
In this Note we consider an economy composed by two firms; a leader and a follower, that invest in R...
This paper models the optimal provision of incentives to corporate scientists, within an environment...
This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a ...
This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cou...
This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cou...
The paper examines the equilibrium relationship between managerial incentives and product market com...
This paper investigates whether aligning manager and owner incentives can improve the innovation per...
In this paper we study a one-shot game of R & D between two firms which differ in their incentives t...
This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest...
This paper analyzes a mechanism through which product market competition affects allocation of the m...
This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest...
We study the R&D performance of Cournot aligopolists. To this end we model a one-shot noncooperative...
We provide a simple framework to analyze the effect of firm dom-inance on incentives for R&D. An...
This paper examines the intensity of researchers incentives to innovate in a context with involuntar...
In this Note we consider an economy composed by two firms; a leader and a follower, that invest in R...
In this Note we consider an economy composed by two firms; a leader and a follower, that invest in R...
This paper models the optimal provision of incentives to corporate scientists, within an environment...
This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a ...
This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cou...
This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cou...
The paper examines the equilibrium relationship between managerial incentives and product market com...
This paper investigates whether aligning manager and owner incentives can improve the innovation per...
In this paper we study a one-shot game of R & D between two firms which differ in their incentives t...
This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest...
This paper analyzes a mechanism through which product market competition affects allocation of the m...
This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest...
We study the R&D performance of Cournot aligopolists. To this end we model a one-shot noncooperative...
We provide a simple framework to analyze the effect of firm dom-inance on incentives for R&D. An...
This paper examines the intensity of researchers incentives to innovate in a context with involuntar...
In this Note we consider an economy composed by two firms; a leader and a follower, that invest in R...
In this Note we consider an economy composed by two firms; a leader and a follower, that invest in R...
This paper models the optimal provision of incentives to corporate scientists, within an environment...