HEGEL’S THEORY OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

U tekstu se razmatra Hegelova teorija političkog predstavništva koja polazi od staleško-korporativnog zastupanja velikih interesa građanskog društva u političkoj državi. Takav oblik predstavništva suprotan je modernom pojmu predstavništva prema kojemu je supstrat predstavljanja uvijek narod kao zajednica slobodnih i jednakih građana koju predstavnik tek treba formirati kao jedinstven i djelatno sposoban subjekt. Kako bi se primjereno vrednovala Hegelova teorija predstavništva i njezini izgledi u suvremenim predstavničkim demokracijama, u tekstu se najprije analizira Hegelova koncepcija ustava koji je širi institucionalni mehanizam posredovanja društvene i političke sfere. Nakon toga prikazuje se Hegelova kritika predstavničke demokracije koja je, prema njemu, oblik predstavništva neprimjeren modernoj državi. Polazeći naime od naroda kao zajednice slobodnih i jednakih građana te svodeći njihovu političku aktivnost na glasovanje na izborima, predstavnička demokracija prema Hegelu isključuje zastupanje posebnih društvenih interesa i istinsku participaciju građana u političkim poslovima, zbog čega ima za posljedicu formalističko određenje države. Osnovni uvid koji Hegelu omogućuje prevladavanje tih proturječnosti predstavničke demokracije uvid je o modernom građanskom društvu kao mjestu povijesne emancipacije čovjeka. Zato upravo “staleži” – formacije proizišle iz podjele rada – i “korporacije” – interesna udruženja pojedinaca – postaju instrument posredovanja društvene i političke sfere u Filozofiji prava. No upravo taj uvid osnovni je problem Hegelove teorije predstavništva jer zbog njega Hegel potpuno previđa politički potencijal demokratske konstitucije državne vlasti. Ipak, Hegelovo “interesno” predstavništvo nije neprimjenjivo u suvremenim predstavničkim demokracijama – štoviše, ono je nužan funkcionalni korektiv modernom pojmu predstavništva, element koji jednako pripada zbiljnosti moderne države. Takvu ulogu, nastoji se pokazati u zadnjem dijelu rada, ono ima upravo promatra li se iz perspektive Hegelova nauka o ustavu. Staleška skupština naime kod Hegela ne zauzima ono mjesto koje u modernim predstavničkim sustavima pripada parlamentu na tom mjestu u Hegelovu ustavnom modelu stoji monarh – nego je zamišljena kao posredni organ koji stoji između najviše državne vlasti i naroda. Drugim riječima, staleška skupština druga je predstavnička instanca u kojoj do političkog izražaja dolazi pluralitet građanskog društva i subjektivna sloboda pojedinaca.The text deals with Hegel’s theory of political representation which is founded on the estate-corporative representation of major interests of civil society in the political state. Such a form of representation is contrary to the modern concept of representation; according to the latter, the object of representation is always the people as community of free and equal citizens which the representative is yet to shape into a unique subject capable of activity. In order to value adequately Hegel’s theory of representation and its potential in contemporary representative democracies, the text begins by analyzing Hegel’s idea of the constitution as a wider institutional mechanism of mediation between the social and political spheres. This is followed by an overview of Hegel’s criticism of representative democracy, which he perceived as a form of representation inadequate for the modern state. Namely, in Hegel’s judgment, representative democracy, with its starting point of the people as a community of free and equal citizens and its reduction of their political activity to voting in the elections, excludes representation of particular social interests and true participation of citizens in political affairs, which is why it results in a formalistic determination of the state. The basic insight that enables Hegel to overcome those contradictions of representative democracy is the insight regarding modern civil society as the locus of historical emancipation of man. Thus precisely the “estates” – formations resulting from the division of labour – and “corporations” – interest associations of individuals – become the instrument of mediation between the social and political spheres in The Philosophy of Right. This very insight, however, is the core problem in Hegel’s theory of representation, since it makes Hegel overlook entirely the political potential of democratic establishment of state authority. Still, Hegel’s “interest” representation is not inapplicable to contemporary representative democracies – indeed, it is a necessary functional corrective to the modern concept of representation, the element which equally belongs to the reality of the modern state. The final part of the text strives to show that it plays such a role precisely if observed from the viewpoint of Hegel’s teachings on the constitution. In Hegel, namely, the estate assembly does not occupy the place which, in modern representative systems, belongs to the parliament – in Hegel’s constitutional model, that place is occupied by the monarch – but is instead conceived as a mediatory organ positioned between the supreme state authority and the people. In other words, the estate assembly is the second instance of representation in which the plurality of civil society and the subjective freedom of individuals come into political prominence