The Cognitional Problem in the Philosophy of Pavao Vuk Pavlović

Spoznajna problematika u Vuk-Pavlovićevoj filosofiji bitno je povezana s ontološkom i aksiološkom; ta je veza karakteristična za samu jezgru njegove filosofije. Svoje stavove o smislu, vrijednosti i dosegu spoznaje, te o mogućnosti i načinima teoretskog zahvaćanja spoznaje, on izvodi iz eidetski usmjerene analize doživljajnih fenomena. Doživljaj (Erlebnis) shvaća kao zbiljski događaj u struji bivstvovanja i u razmatranju zadržava njegove veze s realnošću. U Vuk-Pavlovićevoj usmjerenosti na razmatranje doživljajnih struktura, te u nekim metodskim i sadržajnim rješenjima vidljiv je utjecaj Husserla, pretežno iz njegove deskriptivno-analitičke faze; no Vuk Pavlović odbacuje Husserlov metodski postulat transcendentalnosti, zastupajući realističku liniju fenomenološkog istraživanja. Značajan je u njega također utjecaj Meinongove teorije predmeta. U epistomološkom pogledu, po njegovu naziranju, teorija spoznaje nije jedna jedinstvena znanost, već je strukturalno složenija: njezin središnji dio sačinjava dio metempirike, pod kojom se razumijeva znanost o doživljajnim totalitetima ; ostali dijelovi pridijeljeni su posebnim znanostima, i to, subjektivna funkcija psihologiji, a intencioni predmet teoriji predmeta. Na taj način je moguće da empirička i egzaktna istraživanja pridonesu uvidu u smisao spoznaje. Analogna hijerarhija smisaonih veza proizlazi i za druge humanističke znanosti.Cognitional issues in Vuk-Pavlović\u27s philosophy are essentially related to the ontological and axiological; this connection is characteristic for the very core of his philosophy. His attitudes on meaning, values and the scope of cognition, and the possibility and way of theoretically understanding cognition is deduced by him from an eidetically oriented analysis of experiential phenomena. He perceives experience (Erlebnis) as a real event in the current of being and retains its connection with reality in consideration. Husserl\u27s influence is visible in Vuk-Pavlović\u27s slant towards consideration of experiential structures, and in certain solutions for method and content, particularly Husserl\u27s descriptive-analytical phase; but Vuk-Pavlović rejects Husserl\u27s method postulate of transcendality, preferring a realistic line of phenomenological research. Meinong\u27s theory of the objects also had a significant influence on him. From the epistemological point of view, according to his premise, the theory of cognition is not a single science, rather it is more complex structurally: its central part consists of a part of metempirics, which implies a science of experiential totalities; the rest of the parts are associated with special sciences, such as the subjective function of psychology, and the intentional object of the theory of the object. In this way it is possible for empirical and exact research to contribute to insight into the meaning of cognition. An analogous hierarchy of meaningful connections emerges from the other humanist sciences as well