Differentiation of provisions and general acts in the future practice of the Constitutional Court and Administrative Court upon the occasion of the Administration Dispute Resolution Act 2010

Zakonom o upravnim sporovima iz 2010. godine u hrvatski pravni poredak uveden je institut objektivnog upravnog spora čiji je predmet “opći akt”. Sukladno Zakonu, Visoki upravni sud od 2012. u nadležnosti ima ocjenu zakonitosti općih akata. Temeljnu okosnicu hrvatskog ustavnog sudstva čini apstraktna ocjena ustavnosti zakona te ustavnosti i zakonitosti zakona te drugih propisa. S tim u vezi, postavilo se pitanje razgraničenja nadležnosti između Visokog upravnog suda i Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske. Oba suda imaju u nadležnosti objektivni spor čiji je cilj zaštita objektivnog pravnog poretka, pri čemu je crta razgraničenja odgovor na pitanje: je li nešto opći akt ili je propis? Problem njihova međusobnog razgraničenja uvjetovan je dugogodišnjom praksom Ustavnog suda koji ju je zbog nužnosti osiguranja jedinstva pravnog poretka često brisao razliku među njima. Cilj je ovog rada dati pregled dosadašnjeg stanja hrvatskog zakonodavstva u pogledu sudske kontrole općih akata, analizirati neke aspekte nove zakonske regulative te, u granicama predvidljivog, dati odgovore na pitanja koja se nameću u pogledu njihove primjene.With the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 2010 in Croatian legal order ,the institute of objective administrative dispute the subject of which is the “general act „was introduced. Pursuant to this Act, the High Administrative Court in 2012 in supervision was assessed as having legality of general acts. The fundamental crossroads of the Croatian constitutional judiciary is the abstract grade of constitutionality of law and constitutionality and legality of law and other provisions. Related to this, the question was posed of determining boundaries of authority between the High Administrative Court and Constitutional Court in the Republic of Croatia. Both courts have objective dispute resolution in their jurisdiction, the aim of which is to protect the objective legal order which demarcates the answer to the question of: is something a general act or a provision?’ The problem of their mutual demarcation is conditioned by the long standing practice of the Constitutional Court which, because of the necessity of ensuring unity of the legal order, often eliminated the differences between them.The aim of this paper is to give an overview of the state to date of Croatian legislations in the area of court control of general acts, analysing some aspects of legal regulation and to, within the boundaries of the foreseeable, provide responses to the questions which arise in the area of their application