PREDATORY PRICING IN THE SECTOR OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN AND CROATIAN COMPETITION LAW

Tržište elektroničkih komunikacija specifično je po procesu njegovog otvaranja konkurenciji koje u Europskoj uniji traje od sredine 1980-ih godina. Od 1998. većina operatora, nekadašnjih državnih monopolista, izložena je punoj konkurenciji uz primjenu specifičnog regulatornog okvira i dodatnu primjenu općih pravila o tržišnom natjecanju. Međutim, i na liberaliziranom tržištu mnogi izazovi opstaju budući da nekadašnji monopolisti i dalje drže značajne tržišne pozicije. U tom su smislu naročito značajna „strateška“ tržišta, ona bitno za razvoj informatičkog društva, kao što je tržište pristupa brzom internetu za privatne korisnike. U ovom radu razmatra se primjena pravila o zlouporabi vladajućeg položaja predatorskim cijenama u europskom pravu tržišnog natjecanja, s naglaskom na predmet Wanadoo u kojem je Sud EU-a potvrdio primjenu svoje ranije prakse (tzv. AKZO-kriteriji). Razmatraju se temeljna pravna pitanja relevantna za utvrđivanje zlouporabe predacijom, naročito pitanje je li za dokazivanje predacije potrebno dokazati i mogućnost povrata gubitaka od strane vladajućeg poduzetnika, te može li se predacija opravdati pozivanjem na usklađivanje ponašanja s ponašanjem takmaca. Pristup europskoga prava u ovom kontekstu uspoređuje se i s pristupom američkoga Vrhovnog suda. U radu se raspravlja i o tretmanu instituta zlouporabe predatorskim cijenama u hrvatskom pravu tržišnog natjecanja te se izlaže ključna praksa hrvatske Agencije za zaštitu tržišnog natjecanja.The electronic communications market is a specific phenomenon with respect to the process of its opening to competition that has lasted so far in the European Union starting from the mid eighties of the last century. From 1998 the most operators, who were former state monopolists, have been exposed to full competition which has been regulated within the specific regulatory framework, and additionally, according to the general rules on market competition. Nevertheless, even in liberal market, numerous challenges do prevail due to the fact that the former monopolists still hold significant market positions. In this respect, the “strategic” markets are of the most importance for development of informatics society, for example the market for high speed internet access to private users. The author in this article analyses the application of rules governing the abuse of dominant position by predatory pricing in the European Competition Law paying a special attention to the Wanadoo case. In this case the European Court of Justice has reaffirmed its previous practice (the so called AKZO criteria). The author considers basic legal issues which are relevant to determine the abuse by predatory pricing strategy. She gives a special attention to the issue whether for a finding of predatory pricing it is necessary to prove the recoupment (a possibility that will allow the businessman with a dominant position to generate revenues and profits in the future, and therefore, to compensate the losses incurred during the predatory pricing period). Moreover, the author discusses whether it is possible to justify the predatory pricing with the legitimate price competition in which case the predator substantially lowers the prices as a response to actions of his competitors. Within the context of mentioned legal issues, the author compares European legal approach with the approach taken by the Supreme Court of the United States of America. Furthermore, the author discusses the institute of predatory pricing abuse in the Croatian Competition Law and presents a key practice of the Croatian Agency for Protection of Market Competition