Petrić in the Seventeenth Century

U referatu se polazi od razlikovanja jedne povijesnofilozofske recepcije renesansne filozofije, od jedne recepcije za koju je svojstveno da s onim recipiranim (tj. s renesansnom filozofijom) dijeli isti, tj. zajednički problem. Takva recepcija zove se utjecaj i u tom smislu recipiran je Petrić u sedamnaestom stoljeću. Svojstvenost te recepcije u tome je da ona može biti i anonimna i negativna. U referatu se pokušava preko Mersennove (imenovane i negativne) recepcije Petrića ukazati na mogućnost anonimne – negativne recepcije Petrića u jednom ranom djelu R. Descartesa. Iako kritička (i anonimna), ta bi recepcija bila izuzetno važna, jer je Descartesov argumenat u tekstu koji se možda odnosi na Petrića odigrao važnu ulogu u nastanku ideje utemeljenja znanosti u samoizvjesnosti svijestiThe paper starts from the differentiation of a historical-philosophical reception of the Renaissance philosophy and a reception that is characterized by the feature that it shares the same, common problem with the received (i. e., Renaissance philosophy). This kind of reception is called influence, and Petrić was received in that sense in the 17th century. A characteristic of that reception is that it can be anonymous and negative. The paper aims to use Mersenn’s (specified and negative) reception of Petrić to point at the possibility of an anonymous-negative reception of Petrić in an early work by R. Descartes. Although crytical (and anonymous), this reception would be very important, because Descartes’s argument in the text that may refer to Petrić playes a major role in the creation of the idea of basing science in the self-certainty of consciousness