Time and Temporality: A Heiddegerian Perspective on McTaggart\u27s A-series

J.M.E. McTaggart first employed the now-standard distinction between the A- an B-series in an attempt to prove the unreality of time. I argue that McTaggart\u27s analysis of time requires that a subject exist within the A-series, and as such lends itself to a Heideggerian conception of time, viewed both through Being and Time and Heidegger\u27s interpretation of Aristotle\u27s theory, that necessitates a \u27personal\u27 temporality in order to make \u27world-time\u27 intelligible. I also suggest that Heidegger\u27s temporaility, formulated as a non-successive unity grounded in Dasein\u27s existential constitution as being-in-the-world, circumvents McTaggart\u27s preemptive charge of circularity and therefore also avoids the conclusion that time is unreal