The Act. An Introduction to the Theory of Action in Analytic Philosophy

U tekstu autor pregledno prikazuje suvremenu „teoriju“ ljudskog djelovanja. Taj prikaz raščlanjen je na raspravu (1) o tjelesnim pokretima, (2) o nakanama i hotimičnostima, (3) o razlozima čina i (4) o mogućim odnosima namjere i čina. Pod posljednjom temom autor se načelno suprotstavlja cijelom projektu „objašnjenja ponašanja“, i to kako naturalističkom kauzalnom objašnjenju, tako i kantovskom kauzalnom objašnjenju iz volje, a priklanja se projektu „opisivanja i razumijevanja djelovanja“ u skladu s argumentima (implicitno: Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Von Wright) i protiv prvotno spomenutog projekta (primjerice Chisholm te djelomično Searle). Temeljem obradbe tih tema (1-4) sažimaju se sve navedene ograde uvjeta čina u pregledni kriterij za voljni/slobodni namjeravani ljudski čin u posljednjem odjeljku (5), koji stoji umjesto zaključka.The author of this paper gives a thorough presentation of a contemporary „theory“ of human action and divides it into discourse on (1) bodily movement, (2) intention and purpose (3) reasons for action and (4) the possible relation between intention and action. As regards the latter topic the author disputes in principle the whole project of „explaining behaviour,“ both the naturalistic causal explanation in terms of pure natural causes as well as the Kantian causal explanation proceeding from the will. On the other hand, he tries to advance an alternative project of not „explaining behaviour“ but rather „describing and understanding human action“ in accordance with the arguments of Wittgenstein, Anscombe, von Wright and the counter-arguments of, for example, Chisholm and Searle, in part. Based on the development of these topics (1-4), a summary of all cited limits of the conditions for human action into clearly stated criteria for voluntary/intentional action is made in the final section (5) which takes the place of a conclusion