Riview on Aristotle\u27s Ethics (I.)

Autor iznosi Aristotelovu podjelu znanosti, promatra praktičnu znanost u odnosu na pojedinca i na društvo, nacrtno uvodi u prijepor o izvornosti spisa iz područja etike koji se pripisuju Aristotelu. Polazeći od tvrdnje daje dobro ono čemu sve teži, Aristotel traga za tim dobrom kao krajnjoj svrsi ljudskoga djelovanja. Svi se slažu daje to sreća, koju biramo radi nje same a ne radi nečega drugoga, zato Je Aristotelova etika obilježena kao eudemonistička. Raščlanjujući različita značenja i poimanja sreće Stagirićanin ih prosuđuje i zaključuje da sreća nije život užitaka, politički život nego djelatnost duše prema krjeposti. Da bi se bolje mogao razumjeti govor o krjepostima, autor najprije raščlanjuje Aristotelovo pojmovlje: slobodan izbor, voljno, mimovoljno i protuvoljno, a potom tumači različite vidove duše. U nastavku donosi Aristotelovu podjelu krjeposti na ćudoredne i umne. Ćudoredna krjepostje stanje koje stječemo navikom. Ona je sredina u odnosu prema nama između dvaju poroka, viška i manjka, a vrijednosno gledano ona kao krjepostje krajnost. Autor raščlanjuje Aristotelovu misao o pojedinačnim krjepostima i odgovarajućim porocima, kao primjerice: o hrabrosti, umjerenosti, darežljivosti, izdašnosti, velikodušnosti, blagoćudnosti, istinitosti, stidljivosti, negodovanju a najviše pozornosti posvećuje različitim vidovima pravednosti. Dotičući prijepor oko broja umnih krjeposti, autor izlaže o razboritosti, koja je bitno povezana s ćudorednim krjepostima, i o mudrosti, koja se bavi onim što je najsavršenije. U govoru o prijateljstvu izdvaja tri oblika prijateljstva: radi koristi, radi užitka i prijateljstvo dobrih. Posljednje je pravo prijateljstvo, u kojemu jedan drugomu žele dobro. To mogu samo oni koji su krjeposni. Raspravlja se također i o prijateljstvu u jednakosti i prema premoći i izdvajaju se neki odgovori na pitanja povezana s prijateljstvom. Autor u jednomu Aristotelovu tekstu prepoznaje i otkriva anticipiranu formulaciju Descartesova cogita, što bi mogla biti novost u osvjetljivanju povijesnoga tijeka filozofske zapadne misli. U raspravi o užitku Aristotel nije hedonist ni antihedonist, nego užitak pokušava prepoznati kao poticatelj čovjekova djelovanja. Zato ga ćudoredno prosuđuje i vrjednuje, a mjerilo te prosudbe je čestiti čovjek. Nastavljajući početno Aristotelovo traganje za srećom, ističe se da je čovjekova sreća ono što je sukladno najboljemu, božanskomu u čovjeku, a to je misaono promatranje, koje sliči božanskomu životu. Ta sreća uključuje ćudoredni život, vanjska dobra i prijatelje. Na kraju svega, autor se osvrće na Aristotelovu etičku misao i prosuđuje je.The author presents Aristotle\u27s classification of science, examines practical science in relation to an individual and to societv, brieflv throws into doubt the authenticitv of a piece of writing from the field of ethics attributed to Aristotle. Taking as a starting point the allegation that it is the good that ali aspire to, Aristotle searches for the good as a final purpose of human activity. Ali agree that it is happiness, which we choose for its own šake and not for the šake of something else, that\u27s why Aristotle\u27s ethics is labelled as eudaimonistic. Analvzing the various meanings and conceptions of happiness, Stagirićanin judges them and concludes that happiness is not a life of pleasures, political life, but the soul\u27s activity in the direction of virtue. In order to explain the talk on virtues, the author first analvzes Aristotle\u27s concepts: free choice, willingly, without one\u27s will and against one\u27s will; then he explains different aspects of soul. Then follows the division of virtues into moral and intellectual. Moral virtue is a state acquired by habit. It is a midpoint in relation to ourselves betvveen the two vices, excess and shortage, and axiologically viewed it is the ultimate as a virtue. The author analyzes Aristotle\u27s thought on particular virtues and relevant vices, as for example: on courage, moderateness, generosity, abundance, magnanimity, good nature, trueness, shyness, indignation and his greatest attention is paid to various aspects of justice. Touching on a dispute about the number of intellectual virtues, the author continues his exposition on prudence, which is essentially connected with moral virtues, and also on wisdom, which deals with what is the most perfect. When talking about friendship, the author singles out three forms of friendship: in the interests of benefits, in the interests of enjoyment and the friendship of the good ones. The last one is a real friendship where there is mutual benevolence. It can be achieved only by those who are virtuous. The author also analyzes priority and sets apart some answers to Aristotle\u27s texts. He recognizes and reveals the anticipated formulation of Descartes\u27 cogito, which might present a novelty in throwing light upon the development of western thought. In the dispute on pleasure Aristotle is neither a hedonist nor an antihedonist, but tries to recognize pleasure as a spiritus movens of man\u27s activity and, consequently, judges it and estimates it morally, and the criterion of that judgement is an honest man. Continuing Aristotle\u27s initial searching for happiness, he concludes that man\u27s happiness is what is compatible with the best, with the divine part in man, and that is contemplative observation, which is similar to divine life. That happiness includes moral life, external goods and friends. In the end, the author comments on Aristotle\u27s thought of ethics, critically judges it and places it in the entire philosophical thought of ethics