Cognition between Faith and Doubt

Osim intuitivnih spoznaja kojima (samo)svijest neposredno zna sebe kao postojeće, sve su ostale spoznaje višestruko posredovane. A da bi uopće bile moguće, moraju biti zasnovane na vjerovanju iz kojega jedino mogu proizići čak i najskromnije spoznajne pretpostavke. No iako je snažna vjera ili bar kakvo-takvo vjerovanje u valjanost pretpostavki nužno ishodište svake (raz)umske spoznaje, ipak je tek sumnja ta po kojoj se iz tih pretpostavki može doprijeti do znanja. Jer vjera koja nije otvorena za sumnju i provjeru, spoznajno je jalova. Štoviše ona je istinogubna. Stoga upravo sumnja čini mišljenje kritičkim, a filozofiju kao filo-sofiju razgraničava od arogantnog dogmatizma, zdravorazumske ograničenosti i ideološke lažnosti. Pa ako (raz)umska spoznaja bez vjere ili bar vjerovanja nije moguća, vjera koja ne uvažava ili čak negira (raz)umsku spoznaju nedostojna je življenja.Except for intuitive cognitions by which (self)consciousness is immediately aware of itself as existing, all other cognitions are mediated in multiple ways. To make this possible in the first place they need to be based on the belief from which even the most modest hypotheses can stem. Although firm faith or at least some kind of similar belief in the validity of the hypotheses is the necessary origin of every mental-rational cognition, doubt is the only thing that can lead to knowledge from those hypotheses. Faith which is not open to doubt and verification is cognitively futile. Furthermore, it is truth-evasive. Bearing that in mind doubt is that what makes thinking critical and draws the boundary between philosophy as philo-sophia and arrogant dogmatism, pure-sense limitation and ideological falseness. So if mental-rational cognition without faith or at least belief is not possible, the faith which does not respect or which even negates mental-rational cognition is unworthy of living