CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN POLITICAL PROCESS

Autor analizira suvremenu ulogu ustavnog sudstva i tradicionalnu teoriju trodiobe vlasti. Radikalno zaključuje: Podjela vlasti u smislu Montesquieua, kao oruđa nadzora i balansa u modernoj državi, ne postoji. Nema više socijalnog nasilja na koje bi se takav balans, nadzor ili korektura primijenilo. U takvoj situaciji postaju uloga, izbor i djelatnost ustavnih sudaca od prvorazrednog značaja za nadzor, korekturu i balansiranje političkog procesa.The author analyses the role of the constitutional judiciary and the traditional theory of the tripartite division of power. His radical conclusion is: the division of power in Montesquieu’s sense, as a tool of control and balance in modern state, does not exist. There is no social violence to which such balance, control or correction could be applied to. In such circumstances, the role, selection and work of constitutional judges is of utmost significance for the control, correction and balancing of political process