We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than those driving similar results in the search and matching literature. A marriage is a joint venture where husband and wife contribute to the couple’s welfare by allocating their time to portfolios of risky activities. Men and women are characterised by different preferences over risk and the optimal match is between partners with the same level of risk aversion. In our model no two men (women) rank the same woman (men) as most desirable. Given that there is no unanimous ranking of candidates, everyone marries in equilibrium their most preferred partne
This paper develops a two sided matching model of premarital cohabitation and marriage in which prem...
In many societies, marriage is a decision taken at the familial level. Arranged marriages are docume...
This paper develops a two sided matching model of premarital cohabitation and marriage in which prem...
We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than...
We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than...
We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than...
We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than...
We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than...
This paper studies a marriage market with heterogeneous preferences. Individuals have incentive to a...
This paper combines partner matching with an intra-household allocation model where couples decide i...
We construct a frictionless matching model of the marriage market where women have bidimensional att...
In many societies, marriage is a decision taken at the familial level. Arranged marriages are docume...
In many societies, marriage is a decision taken at the familial level. Arranged marriages are docume...
This paper develops a two sided matching model of premarital cohabitation and marriage in which prem...
This paper develops a two sided matching model of premarital cohabitation and marriage in which prem...
This paper develops a two sided matching model of premarital cohabitation and marriage in which prem...
In many societies, marriage is a decision taken at the familial level. Arranged marriages are docume...
This paper develops a two sided matching model of premarital cohabitation and marriage in which prem...
We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than...
We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than...
We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than...
We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than...
We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than...
This paper studies a marriage market with heterogeneous preferences. Individuals have incentive to a...
This paper combines partner matching with an intra-household allocation model where couples decide i...
We construct a frictionless matching model of the marriage market where women have bidimensional att...
In many societies, marriage is a decision taken at the familial level. Arranged marriages are docume...
In many societies, marriage is a decision taken at the familial level. Arranged marriages are docume...
This paper develops a two sided matching model of premarital cohabitation and marriage in which prem...
This paper develops a two sided matching model of premarital cohabitation and marriage in which prem...
This paper develops a two sided matching model of premarital cohabitation and marriage in which prem...
In many societies, marriage is a decision taken at the familial level. Arranged marriages are docume...
This paper develops a two sided matching model of premarital cohabitation and marriage in which prem...