Cosmopolitanism as virtue

This paper explores cosmopolitanism, not as a position within political philosophy or international relations, but as a virtuous stance taken by individuals who see their responsibilities as extending globally. Taking as its cue some recent writing by Kwame Anthony Appiah, it argues for a number of virtues that are inherent in, and required by, such a stance. It is critical of what it sees as a limited scope in Appiah\u27s conception and enriches it with Nigel Dower\u27s concept of \u27global citizenship\u27. It then seeks to overcome a distinction that Appiah draws between a \u27thin\u27 moral conception of justice and a \u27thick\u27 ethical conception of our obligations to those with whom we have identity-forming relationships. It argues that a richer conception of the virtue of justice, as suggested by Raimond Gaita, can fully articulate the ideals of cosmopolitanism.