Add to ORKGThis note provides an alternative, elementary proof of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian's well-known result on the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the private provision of a public good when all goods are normal
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntar...
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntar...
This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed ...
This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed n...
This dissertation examines the Nash equilibrium in giving by private individuals when the gifts are ...
The purpose of this paper is to show that the necessary and sufficient conditions of the local stabi...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
Vie generalize a less known Nash equilibrium uniqueness result for games in strategic form. Its powe...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant game-theoretic model of an economy with one p...
We extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision to allow for two or more public goods,...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
The main findings of the theory on the private provision of public goods under the assumptions of sy...
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods including also non- Samuelsonia...
The main findings of the theory on the private provision of public goods under the assumptions of sy...
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntar...
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntar...
This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed ...
This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed n...
This dissertation examines the Nash equilibrium in giving by private individuals when the gifts are ...
The purpose of this paper is to show that the necessary and sufficient conditions of the local stabi...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
Vie generalize a less known Nash equilibrium uniqueness result for games in strategic form. Its powe...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant game-theoretic model of an economy with one p...
We extend the simple model of voluntary public good provision to allow for two or more public goods,...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
The main findings of the theory on the private provision of public goods under the assumptions of sy...
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods including also non- Samuelsonia...
The main findings of the theory on the private provision of public goods under the assumptions of sy...
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntar...
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntar...
This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed ...