Add to ORKGTwo-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage-game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analyzed the restricted class of conflicting interest games
This paper studies reputation e¤ects in a 2-player repeated moral hazard game. A long-lived player, ...
Much of the recent interest in the economic applications of game theory has been drawn to time-incon...
We study two-person repeated games in which a player with a restricted set of strategies plays again...
Abstract: Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty a...
Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the ty...
Abstract: The paper analyzes reputation effects in general perturbed repeated games with discounting...
The paper analyzes reputation effects in perturbed repeated games with discounting. If there is some...
In the reputation literature, players have commitment types, which represent the possibility that th...
Abstract. In the reputation literature, players have commitment types which represent the possibilit...
We consider two-person undiscounted and discounted infinitely repeated games in which every player p...
We analyze reputation effects in two-player repeated games of strictly conflict-ing interests. In su...
Abstract. In the reputation literature, players have commitment types which represent the possibilit...
This paper considers reputation effects in a repeated game between two long-run players, one of whom...
We analyze in a game between a patient player 1 and a non-myopic but less patient opponent, player 2...
Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players ...
This paper studies reputation e¤ects in a 2-player repeated moral hazard game. A long-lived player, ...
Much of the recent interest in the economic applications of game theory has been drawn to time-incon...
We study two-person repeated games in which a player with a restricted set of strategies plays again...
Abstract: Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty a...
Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the ty...
Abstract: The paper analyzes reputation effects in general perturbed repeated games with discounting...
The paper analyzes reputation effects in perturbed repeated games with discounting. If there is some...
In the reputation literature, players have commitment types, which represent the possibility that th...
Abstract. In the reputation literature, players have commitment types which represent the possibilit...
We consider two-person undiscounted and discounted infinitely repeated games in which every player p...
We analyze reputation effects in two-player repeated games of strictly conflict-ing interests. In su...
Abstract. In the reputation literature, players have commitment types which represent the possibilit...
This paper considers reputation effects in a repeated game between two long-run players, one of whom...
We analyze in a game between a patient player 1 and a non-myopic but less patient opponent, player 2...
Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players ...
This paper studies reputation e¤ects in a 2-player repeated moral hazard game. A long-lived player, ...
Much of the recent interest in the economic applications of game theory has been drawn to time-incon...
We study two-person repeated games in which a player with a restricted set of strategies plays again...