Mao\u27s American strategy and the Korean War

Even though the Korean War has been labeled by some as a forgotten war, scholars continue to seek the root of the Sino-U.S. confrontation and Mao\u27s decision to enter the war in Korea. Among the five interpretations I examined, Steven Goldstein compares Mao\u27s intervention to a Greek tragedy. In my opinion, this comes closest to explaining this historical puzzle. However, this interpretation has been largely overlooked by scholarship in the field. My dissertation relies on an understanding of “Mao\u27s American strategy” to comprehend Mao\u27s motivation to enter the war. Mao developed his American strategy in late 1944 and by mid-1945 it was established as the Chinese Communist Party\u27s (CCP) approach to the United States. The CCP\u27s concept of the United States was based on its analysis of Washington\u27s long-term strategic interests in China after World War II. Washington\u27s strategic objective was to insure its influence on China through a pro-America government. The best means to reach this objective was to establish a coalition government, which would follow America\u27s multi-party democratic system. Considering its obvious weakness at that time, the CCP leadership welcomed a coalition government in which the CCP and the Guomindang (GMD), could enjoy equal power. However, after analysis of GMD-CCP relations, Mao reached the conclusion that Jiang would not abandon autocracy no matter how hard Washington pressed him. Therefore, a GMD-CCP clash was inevitable. The United States took the position that it had no choice but to stand on the side of the GMD and to interfere with the Chinese revolution sooner or later. Truman\u27s blockade of the Taiwan Straits, and the United Nations troops\u27 crossing the 38th parallel and marching toward the Yalu in 1950 triggered Mao\u27s intervention. To meet an unavoidable clash, Mao decided to dispatch his army to Korea. In addition to explaining Mao\u27s American strategy, I introduce an international factor: the clash between the National Independence Movement and the constraints of the Cold War. With Mao\u27s American strategy as a chronological line and the international factor as a horizontal circumstance, this dissertation asserts that Mao\u27s involvement in the Korean War can be seen as inevitable—a Greek tragedy