Anonymous communications protocols have been designed to resist attacks that work in a short period of time. However, people typically use the Internet in regular, consistent ways over long periods of time, and consequently they are vulnerable to losing their privacy over the lifetime of those communications. Our work has focused on long-term attacks against anonymous communications systems. The predecessor attack is an example of this kind of attack; the attacker logs the connections of a user over time, eventually linking the connections to the user\u27s machine. In this thesis, we give a proof that shows that the users of all existing anonymous communications systems are vulnerable to the predecessor attack. Then we analyze specific inst...
The anonymous communication protocol Tor constitutes the most widely deployed technology for providi...
The anonymous communication protocol Tor constitutes the most widely deployed technology for providi...
In this dissertation, we study low-latency anonymity protocols and systems. Such systems enable anon...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
Systems that allow users to communicate anonymously with a destination have received increasingly m...
Low latency anonymous network systems, such as Tor, were considered secure against timing attacks wh...
Many recent proposals for anonymous communication omit from their security analyses a consideration ...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
The design of Tor includes a feature that is common to most distributed systems: the protocol is fle...
The popularity of Tor as an anonymity system has made it a popular target for a variety of attacks i...
To perform successful remote timing attacks, an adversary typically collects a series of network tim...
The anonymous communication protocol Tor constitutes the most widely deployed technology for providi...
The anonymous communication protocol Tor constitutes the most widely deployed technology for providi...
In this dissertation, we study low-latency anonymity protocols and systems. Such systems enable anon...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
Systems that allow users to communicate anonymously with a destination have received increasingly m...
Low latency anonymous network systems, such as Tor, were considered secure against timing attacks wh...
Many recent proposals for anonymous communication omit from their security analyses a consideration ...
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper we...
The design of Tor includes a feature that is common to most distributed systems: the protocol is fle...
The popularity of Tor as an anonymity system has made it a popular target for a variety of attacks i...
To perform successful remote timing attacks, an adversary typically collects a series of network tim...
The anonymous communication protocol Tor constitutes the most widely deployed technology for providi...
The anonymous communication protocol Tor constitutes the most widely deployed technology for providi...
In this dissertation, we study low-latency anonymity protocols and systems. Such systems enable anon...