The state of nature and the genesis of commonwealths in Hobbes\u27s political philosophy

A careful reading of Hobbes\u27 philosophical writings reveals that this author forwards no fewer than three distinct conceptions of the pre-political situation which he labels the natural condition of humankind, or the state of nature. By examining the relevant passages from The Elements of Law, De Cive and Leviathan, Hobbes\u27 three principal works of political philosophy, I demonstrate that Hobbes\u27 state of nature should not be interpreted as a single invariant concept but rather as a series of three distinct heuristic or expository models. Further, I claim that distinctions between Hobbes\u27 various conceptions of the state of nature reflect differing background assumptions concerning such factors as the prevailing degree of group stability and the level of abstractness with which representative human beings are characterized. After establishing this framework, I examine why Hobbes chose to include three distinct conceptions of the state of nature within his writings, and explore the relationship which appears to obtain among these three conceptions. I next examine the manner by which each of Hobbes\u27 three types of commonwealth, namely commonwealth by institution, commonwealth by preservation and commonwealth by acquisition, can be understood to arise from each of Hobbes\u27 three conceptions of the state of nature. In this section, I focus my analysis upon the transitions which occur when the unencumbered and isolated individuals who inhabit the state of nature (in its various forms) enter into the social contract by transferring their respective rights of nature to the sovereign of their incipient commonwealth. Moreover, I examine Hobbes\u27 explanation of why each subject incurs an obligation to obey his sovereign\u27s decrees and I address the apparent difficulty of maintaining the subjects\u27 allegiance to their sovereign in light of Hobbes\u27 portrayal of human beings as passionate and predominantly self-serving creatures. I conclude by arguing that given Hobbes\u27 characterization of humans as passionate and predominantly self-serving creatures, one can probably not expect commonwealths to arise in the manner that Hobbes describes, and one can certainly not expect such commonwealths, if established, to endure for any substantial period of time