The economic self as a multidimensional complexity: Towards a critique and reconstruction of economic theory

The recent psychological research called into question the conventional notion of self as a coherent, non-contradictory unity representable by a one-dimensional preference ordering. Unable to account for experimentally-demonstrated, and in part, morality-induced intransitivities and irregularities in the preference pattern of the self, and failing to capture the rich spectrum of diverse and potentially conflicting ethical and other motives and considerations underlying preferences, the conventional notion of one-dimensionally representable self, however useful it may have been in modeling certain economic phenomena, appears to miss much of the richness and complexity that characterizes human behavior. This dissertation explores possibilities for an enriching critique and reconstruction of economic theory so as to meet some of the challenges posed by the recent psychological research on human self. To undertake such a critique and reconstruction, we, first, introduce a notion of multidimensional self that modifies the conventional model. Based on this alternative formulation, we attempt to extend the theories of morality-inclusive individual and social choices, and the theory of value, and prove a number of results. The first set of results include several theorems that demonstrate possible ways in which a multiplicity of conflicted, heterogeneous dimensions underlying preferences could lead to intransitivities in the overall preference pattern of the self. Some of these theorems explore the relations between morality and rationality in individual choices. The second set of results deal with a number of social choice paradoxes. First, we extend and generalize the current results on the Paretian Liberal paradox and the paradox of majority decision in a framework that takes into account the possibility of intransitive individual preferences. Second, we study the relations between morality and economic efficiency in social choices, and attempt to determine whether there is a trade-off between Ethical Pluralism and Pareto efficiency, and whether the presence or absence of intransitive individual preferences affects that trade-off. The third set of results consist of cases that illustrate ways in which multiple dimensions underlying individual preferences render problematic the conventional theory of value