[[alternative]]An Integrated Analysis of Macro and Micro Dimensions (II)

[[abstract]]How did the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adjust itself to maintain one-party dictatorship during the reform era? What is the inner-logic governing the elite recruitment in the CCP? Does the recruitment criterion vary for different positions? How did the party recruit cadres in correspondence to social differentiation so as to legitimatize its representativeness? This research project attempts to focus on China’s elite circulation in the reform era and to explore the issues of elite configuration on both the Marco-level and Micro-level. Given the perspective of regime evolution, the proposal argues that the adjustment of party course in 1978 was initiated and designed according to the party leader’s preference. Since the CCP was not forced to fundamentally change its party course, the breadth and depth of membership adjustment would be constrained by the purpose of maintaining CCP’s dictatorship. This organizational rationale generated a consistent pattern of elite circulation—“Limited Renewal”, which has guided both the elite turnover and transformation over time. I anticipate that, at the macro-level, the composition of party members and Central Committee, would reflect the change of social structure, and at the micro-level, both party and government elites would reveal notable transformation towards technocracy after the early 1980’s. However, both trends in the elite formation were controlled with significant timing differences varying with the level of political power. While the transformation of the Central Committee lag behind that of party members, the latter fell behind the transformation of government elites. Furthermore, there exist longstanding and consistent differences in political credentials and the degree of specialization between party and government elites. Even though the rise of technocrats has recently drawn much attention from literature, the proposal finds the process of elite renewal was much more restricted by CCP’s grip of power. Nevertheless, this pattern of elite circulation has reflected the unique way of regime evolution in China, which balances between the survival prerequisite of one-party dictatorship and the functional device of economic development.