Add to ORKGWe consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
Game theory provides valuable tools to examine expert multi-agent systems. In a cooperative game, co...
In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition ...
Financial support from ECO2009-7616, ECO2012-31962, 2014SGR-142, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Cent...
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are pres...
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are pres...
Financial support from ECO2009-7616, ECO2012-31962, 2014SGR-142, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Cent...
We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provi...
We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with extern...
Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This...
Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption th...
We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal g...
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In partic...
Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
Game theory provides valuable tools to examine expert multi-agent systems. In a cooperative game, co...
In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition ...
Financial support from ECO2009-7616, ECO2012-31962, 2014SGR-142, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Cent...
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are pres...
We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are pres...
Financial support from ECO2009-7616, ECO2012-31962, 2014SGR-142, the Severo Ochoa Programme for Cent...
We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provi...
We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with extern...
Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This...
Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption th...
We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal g...
We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In partic...
Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents gener...
Game theory provides valuable tools to examine expert multi-agent systems. In a cooperative game, co...
In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition ...